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CLASS ACTION BOUNDARIES
Daniel Wilf-Townsend*
In recent years, some judges have begun doubting—and at times denying—
their jurisdiction in class actions whose membership crosses state lines. This
doubt has followed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s significant tightening of
personal jurisdiction doctrine, which has led many to argue that courts no
longer have jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members unless
those claims have some independent relationship with the forum state. Such
an argument raises foundational questions about due process and
federalism, and has significant implications for the size, location, and
feasibility of many class actions.
This Article argues that what it terms the “state-border argument” should
be rejected. Proponents of the argument have cast it as a natural implication
of defendants’ due process rights, ignoring the underlying question about
what scope those rights have to begin with. Due process rights are often
understood to have different contours in the context of representative
litigation, such as class actions. And representative litigation has
historically been a tool for resolving disputes even when doing so requires
expansive understandings of courts’ territorial authority. Meanwhile, the
underlying concerns of personal jurisdiction doctrine either do not clearly
support the state-border argument or actively militate against it. As a result,
defendants’ due process rights do not require courts to apply the same
personal jurisdiction tests to unnamed, out-of-state class members as those
that are applied to named plaintiffs, and class actions should be permitted to
proceed as they have for decades.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: Money Corp., a bank incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in New York, systematically defrauds hundreds
of thousands of its customers by creating fake accounts in their names to
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boost the bank’s performance statistics.1 A group of those customers who
live in Illinois are injured by fines and fees that were charged to them as a
result of this fraud, and they file suit in the federal district court in Chicago
alleging violations of state and federal law. The customers also seek to
represent a nationwide class of Money Corp. customers who were similarly
injured. Can such a nationwide class action be heard in Illinois?
For most of the lifespan of the modern class action, there would have been
little argument that the geography of such a lawsuit—a nationwide class
arising out of one of the states where the alleged harm occurred—would
cause a jurisdictional problem. Plaintiffs have been able to challenge a
defendant’s multistate or nationwide course of conduct with a similarly broad
multistate or nationwide class action in courts around the country, with few
geographic restrictions.
But in recent years, a new argument has emerged that such class actions
should be constrained by states’ borders.2 This argument, which has arisen
in more than sixty class action cases across the country and which has been
accepted by numerous judges and commentators, has been fueled by two
related developments.3 The first is new restrictions on the doctrine of general
jurisdiction, which used to allow many class actions to proceed without any
inquiry as to their relationship with the forum state. With general jurisdiction
no longer widely available, questions of courts’ territorial power are now
more often governed by specific jurisdiction, a doctrine that focuses on the
relationship between plaintiffs’ claims and the forum in which the claims are
brought.4 The second development, in turn, is a set of cases in which the
U.S. Supreme Court has tightened the tests governing specific jurisdiction.
The most notable of these for purposes of class actions is the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court5 (BMS),
which rejected the notion that plaintiffs in a mass (not class) action could
establish specific jurisdiction in a given forum based only on their claims’
similarity to other claims that have a more direct connection to the forum.6
There is a seemingly straightforward argument that BMS’s holding should be
extended to class actions because class actions are based on the similarity of
claims between the named class representatives and the unnamed absent class
members.7
Adopting this argument, which this Article terms the “state-border
argument,” would result in a sea change in the law.8 The state-border
1. Cf. Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo’s Sales-Scandal Tally Grows to Around 3.5 Million
Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargossales-scandal-tally-grows-to-around-3-5-million-accounts-1504184598
[https://perma.cc/
C94R-CJQT].
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
6. See id. at 1777, 1781–82; see also infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See, e.g., Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 2020) (Wood, J.) (noting
that adopting the state-border argument would be “a major change in the law of personal
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argument holds that the claims of absent, out-of-state class members should
have to meet the same jurisdictional test—the minimum contacts test—that
the claims of the named class representatives in a class action must satisfy.9
As a result, the argument goes, courts should not be able to exercise
jurisdiction over defendants with respect to absent class members’ claims
unless those claims have some independent connection to the forum at issue,
even if jurisdiction is appropriate with respect to the claims of the named
class representatives.10
It is unsurprising, then, that the state-border argument has become one of
the most important and contentious issues in aggregate litigation.11 In many
cases, because large numbers of unnamed class members have little or no
connection to the state in which the class action gets filed, this legal change
would prohibit jurisdiction over multistate class actions that used to be
completely ordinary. At best, such a change would result in the inefficient
proliferation of small, one-state-at-a-time class actions, or force claimants in
multistate class actions to litigate in the one or two (potentially distant) states
where the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.12 And worse, such a
change could prevent litigants in smaller states from having their claims
heard, thwart multistate class actions when multiple defendants are located
in different states, generate conflicting judicial outcomes, and allow
defendants to “reverse forum shop” by consenting to nationwide jurisdiction
in states where they are able to litigate or settle on more favorable terms.13

jurisdiction and class actions”). This Article also refers at times to the “state-border question,”
i.e., the question whether the state-border argument is correct.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra notes 14–15, 26 (identifying academic articles discussing the state-border
argument); see also Gregory J. Casas, Alan W. Hersh & Blakeley S. Oranburg, The
Perpetuation of Class-Action Forum Shopping?: Federal Circuits Address Whether Courts
Need Personal Jurisdiction to Hear Nationwide Class Actions, NAT’L L. REV. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/perpetuation-class-action-forum-shopping-federalcircuits-address-whether-courts [https://perma.cc/3LSR-5UKQ]; KEARA M. GORDON,
ISABELLE ORD, CHRISTOPHER M. YOUNG, COLLEEN CAREY GULLIVER & DAVID PRIEBE, DLA
PIPER, MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: WHAT TO WATCH FOR
THROUGHOUT
2019,
at
6–7
(2019),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/
publications/2019/06/major-developments-in-class-action-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/
ERU6-GNKE]; JULIANNA THOMAS MCCABE, CARLTON FIELDS, THE LONG REACH OF CLASS
ACTIONS: TRENDS IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 35 (2018), https://nysba.org/NYSBA/
Meetings%20Department/2019%20Annual%20Meeting/Coursebooks/TICL%20and%20Tria
l%20Lawyers%20Sections/CarltonFields2018-class-action-survey-C1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LG8-T68L] (listing BMS as the second-most-mentioned Supreme Court
case identified by corporate counsel as impacting their approach to class action management,
behind Spokeo v. Robins).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV; see also Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on
Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59
B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1289 (2018) (discussing the reverse-forum-shopping problem of “reverse
auctions”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing some analogous problems in the context of mass
actions).

2022]

CLASS ACTION BOUNDARIES

1615

The state-border argument has garnered significant attention, but most
scholarship to date has taken one of two paths: (1) concluding that the
argument is correct14 or (2) assuming that courts will adopt the argument and
therefore focusing on the ramifications of such a significant change.15 Such
approaches are understandable, given that the trend of the Supreme Court’s
case law has generally been restrictive when it comes to both class actions
and personal jurisdiction.16 But focusing on the effects of courts’ adoption
of the state-border argument may also be premature: in a recent survey of
more than sixty rulings on the issue in the last few years, a significant
supermajority of judges who considered the argument rejected it.17
Although this judicial trend is notable, it does not indicate that the merits
of the state-border question have been fully addressed. To the contrary, many
judges have interpreted the argument essentially as a question of the correct
application of the Supreme Court’s decision in BMS and have rested their
rulings in large part on the fact that BMS did not explicitly extend itself to
class actions—often without much more reasoning than that.18 As a result,
despite the frequency with which the issue has arisen in recent years, courts
have yet to develop a systematic account of why one answer is better than

14. Two articles address the state-border argument in detail and conclude that the
minimum contacts test should be applied to unnamed class members. See Louis J. Capozzi III,
Relationship Problems: Pendent Personal Jurisdiction After Bristol-Myers Squibb, 11
DREXEL L. REV. 215, 278–80 (2018); A. Benjamin Spencer, Out of the Quandary: Personal
Jurisdiction over Absent Class Member Claims Explained, 39 REV. LITIG. 31, 51–52 (2019).
Another reaches the same conclusion with little discussion. See Philip S. Goldberg,
Christopher E. Appel & Victor E. Schwartz, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction
Paradigm Shift to End Litigation Tourism, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 77–78
(2019); see also infra notes 15, 26 (discussing other existing scholarship that addresses the
state-border argument).
15. The primary approach in the scholarship to date has been to examine the implications
that this argument will have for class actions, proceeding from the assumption that courts will
likely conclude that the minimum contacts test should apply to the claims of absent class
members, rather than spending significant time analyzing the merits of that argument. See
Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1281–91; Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and
Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 28–32 (2018); Samuel P. Jordan, Hybrid Removal, 104
IOWA L. REV. 793, 799–805 (2019); Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and
Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1429–33 (2018). See generally Annie
McClellan, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County,
et al: A Death Knell for Nationwide Class Actions?, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 829 (2019). Other
articles discuss the debate in the context of other arguments regarding personal jurisdiction
doctrine, also without spending significant time analyzing which side of the debate is correct.
See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 23, 96–98 (2018); Alan B. Morrison, Safe at Home: The Supreme Court’s
Personal Jurisdiction Gift to Business, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 517, 551–55 (2019).
16. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1285–86 (“The door remains open for the
Court to look only to the named plaintiffs’ claims when assessing the connection between the
litigation and the forum state . . . . But, given recent trends in personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction, and class action law, we would not bet on it, at least in the mass-tort
context.”).
17. See generally Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers Squibb Kill the Nationwide
Class Action?, 129 YALE L.J.F. 205 (2019) (surveying court rulings in the first two years after
BMS).
18. See id.; see also infra Part I.C.
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another.19 And with only two federal circuit courts weighing in so far, it is
far from clear where the law will ultimately end up.20
This Article builds such an account, defending the outcome in the majority
of cases and responding to the concerns raised by the state-border argument.
The Article explains that the state-border argument, by focusing myopically
on jurisdictional tests developed and articulated outside of the context of
representative litigation, falls short in two ways. First, it overlooks the
historical and doctrinal support for treating representative litigation as
meaningfully different from traditional litigation when it comes to questions
of courts’ power and litigants’ rights. And second, it does not properly
balance the relevant concerns protected by personal jurisdiction doctrine,
namely fairness to defendants and the protection of states’ interests in a
system of horizontal federalism. The state-border argument thus departs
from the methodology of past Supreme Court cases in similar contexts.21
These cases suggest that when evaluating the requirements of due process in
the context of representative litigation, rather than mechanically applying
doctrinal due process tests from the nonrepresentative context, we should
consider both the unique traditions and goals of representative litigation as
well as the fundamental underlying concerns of due process.22
The Article therefore reexamines the state-border argument in light of
these broader considerations: the rules, goals, and traditions of representative
litigation and the basic concerns articulated in personal jurisdiction doctrine.
It concludes that these considerations militate against the state-border
argument. The treatment of absent class members in other contexts suggests
that they should not be subject to the same jurisdictional rules as those that
apply to class representatives.23
And representative litigation has,
historically, been used as a tool for courts to expand their territorial power,
with courts sometimes explicitly praising this function of the class device.24
Meanwhile, the two primary concerns of personal jurisdiction doctrine—the
fair treatment of defendants and the balance of state powers in a system of
horizontal federalism—do not support the state-border argument. The
structure of class actions, in which the claims of absent class members are
19. See generally Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17.
20. See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020); Lyngaas v. Ag, 992
F.3d 412, 435 (6th Cir. 2021) (following Mussat). The state-border question has also arisen
in other federal circuit cases that have declined to reach a ruling on the merits of the issue.
See, e.g., Moser v. Benefytt, Inc., 8 F.4th 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2021); Cruson v. Jackson Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 240, 252 (5th Cir. 2020); Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952
F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020). A related but distinct issue—how BMS applies in collective
actions brought in federal courts under the Fair Labor Standards Act—has arisen in several
other federal appellate cases and has split the courts. See Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS,
Inc., No. 20-1997, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1061 (1st Cir. Jan. 13, 2022); Vallone v. CJS Sols.
Grp., LLC, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021); Canaday v. Anthem Cos., Inc., 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir.
2021).
21. See infra Part II (discussing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985),
and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
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highly similar to the claims of the named representative, limits the additional
litigation burdens that a defendant may face. In turn, the horizontal
federalism concerns raised by multistate class actions are mitigated by a
variety of factors, and multistate class actions bring a range of benefits that
sound in horizontal federalism as well.25 Multistate class actions allow for
more efficient and effective resolutions of disputes, avoid the possibility of
conflicting judgments, and protect the citizens of states that may not be
populous enough to support as-robust private enforcement within their own
borders. As a result, the horizontal federalism considerations supported by
personal jurisdiction doctrine weigh against adopting the state-border
argument.26
The Article proceeds as follows: First, Part I provides an overview of the
state-border argument, detailing how and why it has arisen in recent years.
Part II then discusses the proper framing of the questions raised by the
state-border argument, critiquing two existing approaches to the argument.
Next, Part III considers the state-border argument in light of the doctrines
and history of representative litigation in particular. Part IV then evaluates
the state-border argument from the perspectives of fairness and horizontal
federalism, concluding that fairness concerns do not require adopting the
state-border argument and that horizontal federalism concerns suggest that it
should be rejected.
I. THE STATE-BORDER ARGUMENT IN MULTISTATE CLASS ACTIONS
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction governs the geographic scope of
courts’ power, determining when and whether a state or nation’s courts may
hear a particular dispute and issue a binding judgment on the parties
involved.27 For a court to assess the availability of personal jurisdiction, it
must consider the relationship between the defendant, the forum in issue, and

25. Id.
26. This Article thus takes a different tack than existing work that argues against the
extension of BMS to the claims of unnamed class members. See David Marcus & Will
Ostrander, Class Actions, Jurisdiction, and Principle in Doctrinal Design, 2019 BYU L. REV.
1511; Megan Crowe, Can You Relate?: Bristol-Myers Narrowed the Relatedness
Requirement but Changed Little in the Specific Jurisdiction Analysis, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 505,
515 (2019); David W. Ichel, A New Guard at the Courthouse Door: Corporate Personal
Jurisdiction in Complex Litigation After the Supreme Court’s Decision Quartet, 71 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1, 37–48 (2018); Justin A. Stone, Note, Totally Class-Less?: Examining
Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to Class Actions, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 833 (2018). The
most thorough discussion of BMS’s application in this context comes from David Marcus and
Will Ostrander, who focus on the state-border argument as it arises in and informs the
long-running debate over whether to understand class actions as a dispute-resolution device
or a regulatory tool. See Marcus & Ostrander, supra, at 1520–33. Marcus and Ostrander do
consider the state-border argument in light of the concerns articulated in personal jurisdiction
doctrine, but it is not the focus of their article. Compare id. at 1547–49, with infra Part IV. In
contrast, this Article focuses on the foundational concerns of personal jurisdiction doctrine,
see infra Parts II, IV, and discusses traditional understandings of class litigation as they inform
that doctrine, see infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125–32 (2014).
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the lawsuit.28 In a class action, questions can arise as to how absent class
members should be treated for purposes of this inquiry: Are they just like
the named plaintiffs in a class action? Does their location matter, and if so,
how does it matter?
These questions are not new, but they have mostly lain dormant for
decades. The Supreme Court has examined personal jurisdiction in the class
action context only once, nearly forty years ago, when Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts29 considered the due process rights of absent class-member
plaintiffs.30 The question of what a defendant’s rights require with respect
to personal jurisdiction and the claims of absent class members, meanwhile,
was largely unaddressed by anyone until the last few years.31
This part describes how and why that question has recently arisen to
become one of the most important and contested issues in class litigation. As
it describes, over the last decade, the Supreme Court has drastically narrowed
the doctrine of general jurisdiction, decreasing plaintiffs’ ability to bring
cases with claims that are unconnected to a given forum state. With general
jurisdiction unavailable in many states, plaintiffs now must rely on the more
cabined doctrine of specific jurisdiction. The Court’s decision in BMS, in
turn, immediately raised questions about how the rules of specific
jurisdiction apply in the class action context to the claims of absent class
members. The result is that the last few years have seen scores of cases
asking whether a defendant’s due process rights require courts to apply the
minimum contacts test to the claims of absent class members.
A. The Narrowing of Personal Jurisdiction
The narrative of the traditional canon of personal jurisdiction cases,
ranging from Pennoyer v. Neff32 through International Shoe Co. v.
Washington33 and into the twenty-first century, has become a familiar tale in
law review articles and classrooms alike.34 The Supreme Court is in the
midst of adding a new chapter to that narrative: After a relatively peaceful
period in the 1990s and 2000s, the last decade has seen a steady march of

28. Id. at 126.
29. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
30. Id. at 799.
31. The question of what a defendant’s due process rights require regarding personal
jurisdiction over absent class members’ claims is addressed in depth in two law review articles
separated by decades, both of which predate the Court’s sweeping revision of the doctrine of
general jurisdiction. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked
in the National Debate About Class Action Fairness, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 1313 (2005); Diane
P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597 (1987). Otherwise,
the issue appears to have largely been ignored in both the academic literature and case law
prior to BMS.
32. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1165, 1178 (2018) (noting that “[t]he American personal jurisdiction story is familiar
and oft told”).
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new, significant cases.35 Individually and collectively, these cases have had
the effect of restricting the ability of plaintiffs to bring defendants into state
and federal court in a wide variety of scenarios.36
In the first half of the 2010s, the Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown37 and Daimler AG v. Bauman38 brought
about the most significant change in personal jurisdiction doctrine since
International Shoe itself. For the first sixty-plus years after International
Shoe, courts throughout the country had interpreted that case’s “continuous
and systematic” standard for general jurisdiction to mean that such
jurisdiction was available over a defendant in any state where it had
substantial long-term operations.39 A national hotel chain, for instance, with
numerous buildings and significant revenue in every state, would have been
considered by many courts to be subject to general jurisdiction in every
state.40 General jurisdiction, in turn, is a doctrine that provides for
jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular forum without asking about the
relationship between the claims at issue in the lawsuit and the forum itself.
This meant that plaintiffs suing a large, established company often did not
have to worry much about personal jurisdiction because general jurisdiction
was available in many states.
But in Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court restricted general
jurisdiction’s availability to only those places where a defendant could be
considered “essentially at home.”41 As a result, with limited (and possibly
nonexistent) exceptions, defendants are now subject to general jurisdiction
only in the state where they are incorporated and/or the state in which they
35. See generally Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017
(2021); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
36. See Dodson, supra note 15, at 15 (describing “how personal jurisdiction has changed
from being relatively expansive . . . to being more constrictive”). In state court, personal
jurisdiction over defendants is governed by state statute, state constitutions, and the limits of
the U.S. Constitution—in particular, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). In many
cases, the limitations that the Fourteenth Amendment places on state jurisdiction effectively
end up limiting federal courts, as well, under the federal rules governing service of process.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
37. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
38. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
39. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2014) (“Procedure
casebooks taught students that national corporations with substantial operations in all fifty
states (such as McDonalds or WalMart) would likely be subject to general personal
jurisdiction in all fifty states.”).
40. See id. (providing this example). It is important to note that even if this result may
have been common, there was still widespread disagreement and inconsistency regarding
many dimensions of the “continuous and systematic” test. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 856–86 (2004) (surveying cases
in a variety of contexts). Nonetheless, “[p]rior to Goodyear, the common understanding was
that companies doing substantial business in all fifty states . . . would have been subject to
general jurisdiction in every state.” Dodson, supra note 15, at 24.
41. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrel, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017).
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have their principal place of business.42 So the same national hotel chain that
once may have been subject to general jurisdiction in fifty states is now
subject to general jurisdiction in only two states (or only one state, if it is
headquartered in the same state in which it is incorporated).
This change, in turn, puts significantly more pressure on the doctrine of
specific jurisdiction.43 Specific jurisdiction, or “case-linked” jurisdiction,
requires a plaintiff to prove that their chosen forum has some sort of
relationship to the case at hand that justifies the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction.44 But the Court’s case law has been vague about precisely what
kind of relationship is satisfactory.45 The general formulation that courts
have converged on is a three-part “minimum contacts” test, in which a
plaintiff must show (1) that a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the
forum state in some way; (2) that the “contacts” created by that purposeful
availment are related to the lawsuit in some way; and (3) that the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable, given all the circumstances of the suit.46 But even
with this three-part test, much ambiguity remains about how exactly specific
jurisdiction applies in any given situation.47
Now that general jurisdiction is less available, the ambiguities and
unanswered questions of specific jurisdiction are increasingly relevant.
Specific jurisdiction remains the only path for many lawsuits and litigation
strategies. Plaintiffs often prefer to sue somewhere other than a company’s
state of incorporation or principal place of business—perhaps because the
plaintiff lives in a different state or was injured there, or because the law,
judges, or juries are perceived as more favorable there. Some plaintiffs may
not have a choice—for instance, if two defendants are indispensable parties
to a lawsuit and are not both subject to general jurisdiction in the same state,
specific jurisdiction may be the only path forward for the suit to proceed.48
But whatever the reason, plaintiffs who do not wish to file their suit in a

42. Id. The Court has acknowledged the possibility of an “exceptional case” where “a
corporate defendant’s operations in another forum ‘may be so substantial and of such a nature
as to render the corporation at home in that State,’” id., but it is not clear what magnitude of
activity would be necessary to trigger that exception, see id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority’s opinion in BNSF Ry. Co. “is so narrow as to read the
exception out of existence entirely”).
43. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 157 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the holding regarding general jurisdiction “curtails the States’
sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes,” leaving only specific jurisdiction as an option).
44. See, e.g., Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 39, at 230–31.
45. Id.
46. See Linda Sandstrom Simar, Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Ford’s Hidden Fairness Defect, 106 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 45, 48 (2020) (noting
that lower courts have “largely converged” around this test).
47. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipurksy,
Case-Linked Jurisdiction and Busybody States, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 54, 73–74
(2020) (describing ambiguities in specific-jurisdiction doctrine).
48. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulties in bringing cases “against two or more
defendants headquartered and incorporated in different States” or against a defendant “not
headquartered or incorporated in the United States”).
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defendant’s home state or are unable to do so must now rely on the
availability of specific jurisdiction to bring their claims.
B. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Bristol-Myers Squibb
in June 2017.49 The facts giving rise to BMS parallel those of many large
pharmaceutical tort suits.50 Bristol-Myers Squibb, a drug company
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, developed a
prescription blood thinner called Plavix that it sold nationwide.51 Its sales in
California in particular were extensive, with more than $900 million in sales
revenue in the state over a six-year period generated by the sale of nearly 187
million Plavix pills.52 A large group of plaintiffs sued the company in
California state court, alleging that they had been injured and that the
company had knowingly made false representations about the drug’s safety
and efficacy.53 The suit was structured as a mass tort suit rather than as a
class action—all 678 plaintiffs were named parties, and no class certification
was sought.54 Of those plaintiffs, eighty-six were residents of California and
the rest were spread across thirty-three other states.55
Significantly, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, these out-of-state
residents did not allege that their claims had any sort of connection to events
that took place in California.56 They “did not allege that they obtained Plavix
through California physicians or from any other California source; nor did
they claim that they were injured by Plavix or were treated for their injuries
in California.”57 Although California’s state courts upheld jurisdiction, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that no jurisdiction existed regarding
the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.58
In its description of the legal standards governing the case, the Court
placed particular emphasis on concerns about federalism, affirming the
statement in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson59 that “[t]he
sovereignty of each State implies a limitation on the sovereignty of all its
sister States,” and noting that “this federalism interest may be decisive,”
49. Id. at 1773.
50. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1274 (“On the substance, Bristol-Myers is
something of a standard defective-drug case.”).
51. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78.
52. Id.
53. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016).
54. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
55. Id. One plausible explanation for why the lawsuit was structured this way is that it
was devised both as an alternative to the existing Plavix multidistrict litigation in federal court
and to avoid being removable under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). See Bradt
& Rave, supra note 13, at 1274–75. The plaintiffs had added a state defendant (a
California-based drug distributor), and the case was structured as a series of separate
complaints that each had fewer than one hundred plaintiffs to thwart CAFA’s removal
provisions for “mass actions.” Id.
56. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1784.
59. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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conclusively militating against jurisdiction even where the other factors all
favor jurisdiction.60 The Court located this federalism interest in the
traditional due process analysis regarding “the burden on the defendant” of
litigating the case, saying that this consideration “encompasses the more
abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have
little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”61
But when it came time to apply the law to the facts of the case, there was
little analysis of the burden on the defendant or a weighing of the factors
favoring jurisdiction.62 Instead, the Court relied primarily on its statement in
Walden v. Fiore63 that “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party,
standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction,” and held that to mean
that “[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and
ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as
did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction
over the nonresidents’ claims.”64 The Court stated that it was not breaking
new doctrinal ground, announcing that its holding resulted from a
“straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction.”65
C. The State-Border Argument Emerges
Before the ink was dry on the Court’s opinion in BMS, commenters began
asking whether the decision contained implications for class action practice
throughout the country.66 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor flagged the class

60. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (ellipses and bracket omitted) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980)).
61. Id. The Court did not reference the footnote in Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982), which some have seen as walking
back World-Wide Volkswagen’s language by rejecting the notion that this “federalism
concept” might “operate[] as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court.”
See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 15, at 16 (describing Bauxites as “distanc[ing] personal
jurisdiction’s connection to both interstate federalism and state sovereignty, and instead
link[ing] personal jurisdiction primarily (even solely) to individual rights”); Robert J. Condlin,
“Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”?: It’s Time for the Supreme Court to
Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 80
n.170 (2004) (describing Bauxites’s “repudiation of the ‘instrument of interstate federalism’
conception of due process”); see also Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J.
1, 65 n.261 (2010) (critiquing the rationales offered in Bauxites for retreating from the
federalism emphasis in World-Wide Volkswagen). It is possible, though, to harmonize
Bauxites and World-Wide Volkswagen, largely along the lines of reasoning deployed in BMS.
See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 711–12 (1987) (describing how the federalism concerns
protected by due process, as well as the ability of a plaintiff to consent to jurisdiction, make
sense together as an individual “right to resist unauthorized jurisdiction”).
62. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82.
63. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
64. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115,
1123 (2014)).
65. Id. at 1783.
66. See, e.g., Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb the End of
an Era?, FORBES (July 11, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2017/
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action issue, noting that the majority opinion did not confront the question of
how its decision would apply to multistate class actions.67 But many began
arguing nonetheless that BMS should be read as prohibiting a court’s exercise
of jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to the claims of out-of-state class
members, unless the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in the forum
state or unless the out-of-state class members’ claims have some connection
to the forum.68
This “state-border argument” amounts to a stance that the claims of absent
class members must satisfy the minimum contacts test for a court to have
jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to the class. The basic argument
is that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a defendant regarding the
claims of absent class members if jurisdiction would have been lacking with
respect to those claims standing on their own outside of the class action. In
other words, the fact that there are named representatives over whose claims
the court does have jurisdiction does not add anything that enables the court
to have jurisdiction over other people’s claims. And because the minimum
contacts test is the critical test for specific personal jurisdiction—i.e., the test
that is applied when general jurisdiction is not available—as a practical
matter, the state-border argument can also be stated as the position that,
where general jurisdiction over a defendant is unavailable, a court does not
have jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to the claims of the absent,
unnamed members of a class action unless those claims can satisfy the
minimum contacts test.
This argument has some appeal. After all, BMS held that the out-of-state
plaintiffs in that case could not justify the state courts’ jurisdiction over the
defendant simply because they “sustained the same injuries” as the in-state
residents.69 At first glance, that logic could plausibly apply to class actions
as well, given that the ability of a class action to proceed is generally
predicated on the similarities between the claims of named representatives
and the claims of the absent class members who they represent.
Perhaps due to this appeal—and its obvious utility for defendants who are
facing multistate class actions and wish to limit their potential liability—the
state-border argument has become widespread, raised in more than eighty
class actions in the first two years after BMS alone.70 The majority of courts
to weigh in on the state-border argument have rejected it, but a notable
minority has accepted it, declining to exercise jurisdiction over class
members outside of the forum state.71 Most of the rulings to date have been
in federal district courts; although the issue has made it to the federal circuit
07/11/the-game-changes-is-bristol-myers-squibb-the-end-of-an-era/?sh=2778f212e831
[https://perma.cc/JSV2-5RAK].
67. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
68. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 206–07 (collecting examples of commenters
making this argument).
69. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
70. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 206–07 (collecting and surveying cases
applying BMS in the class-action context).
71. Id.
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level in several cases, most of the federal appellate courts to be presented
with the issue so far have declined to reach it for a variety of procedural
reasons.72 The only circuit to reach the issue, the Seventh Circuit, has ruled
in keeping with the majority of the district courts and upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to the claims of out-of-state
unnamed class members.73
But despite the many cases to address the issue, much of the analysis in
the case law so far has been brief and ad hoc.74 A common approach among
judicial opinions on the issue has been to say, essentially, that applying BMS
to prohibit jurisdiction in many multistate class actions would amount to a
big change in the law, and the Supreme Court in BMS said that it was
applying only settled law, so BMS does not change anything.75 Courts
looking beyond BMS itself have also frequently pointed to the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Devlin v. Scardelleti76 as precedent indicating that courts
may treat absentee class members as akin to named parties in some
circumstances but not in others.77 But the case law has not developed a deep
or systematic account as to why the flexibility afforded by cases like Devlin
should be exercised in one way or another in response to the questions raised
by BMS.78
In the academic literature, meanwhile, the approach has primarily been to
assume that the state-border argument will be adopted.79 Fewer have
grappled with the question of whether the argument should be adopted,
instead focusing on the implications that adopting the argument would have
for aggregate litigation.80 As a predictive matter, such an approach may be
72. See Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020);
Cruson v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 240, 251–52 (5th Cir. 2020); Beaton v.
SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1465 (2019).
73. Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020).
74. Two significant exceptions are the discussions of the issue by Judge Gary S.
Feinerman in Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815 (N.D. Ill. 2018), and by Judge Diane
Wood in Mussat, 953 F.3d at 445–48, both of which provide more detailed reasoning.
75. See, e.g., Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 17-CV-00085, 2018 WL 3580775, at *3
(W.D. Va. July 25, 2018) (“The Supreme Court, however, described its work more modestly,
writing that the case was a ‘straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction . . . .’ Because this Court does not believe Bristol-Myers Squibb upended years of
class action practice sub silentio, Defendant’s motion will be denied.”); see also
Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 214 (“[M]any cases organized their approach to BMS’s
application by noting what BMS did not say or do.”).
76. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
77. See id. at 9–10; see also Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 819 (quoting Devlin, 536 U.S. at
10); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
78. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 214–25 (providing an overview of the reasoning
and analysis of district court cases addressing the BMS question).
79. See supra note 15.
80. See id. (discussing existing work). There are two main exceptions. The first is
A. Benjamin Spencer’s article Out of the Quandary, supra note 14, which discusses how BMS
should apply in the context of federal courts. Professor Spencer’s work is discussed below.
See infra note 114. The second is David Marcus and Will Ostrander’s article Class Actions,
Jurisdiction, and Principle in Doctrinal Design, supra note 26, which examines the
state-border argument in the context of a larger conversation about the juridical relevance of
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in keeping with the generally restrictive trend of the Supreme Court’s class
action and personal jurisdiction case law.81 But the fact that the state-border
argument has not been widely adopted in the courts—and, in fact, has mostly
been rejected—suggests that it is worth evaluating the argument in greater
depth. The sections that follow do just that.82
II. CLARIFYING THE QUESTION
What is the right way to determine whether the state-border argument is
correct? In other words, how do we know whether the rules of personal
jurisdiction apply to absent class members’ claims in the same way that they
apply to plaintiffs’ claims outside the context of representative litigation?
This part establishes the groundwork for how to approach the state-border
question. In doing so, it critiques two common framings of the question. The
first is that the limitations posed by state boundaries follow naturally from
the priority of the U.S. Constitution over other sources of law. The second
is that the state-border argument is a necessary implication of the fact that
defendants and plaintiffs are differently situated in ways that are relevant to
personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Understanding why these two framings are unsuccessful, in turn, sheds
light on a better approach. The state-border argument requires us to ask about
the nature and scope of the rights protected by personal jurisdiction doctrine;
both of the unsuccessful framings assume this question away. A better
approach to the question grapples with this issue head-on, as past Supreme
Court cases have done: by engaging with the traditional understanding of the
scope of the right, as well as the underlying values at stake. Evaluating the
state-border argument thus necessitates an examination of the values
underlying personal jurisdiction doctrine in the context of representative
group litigation in which the argument arises.
A. Constitutional Requirements and Subconstitutional Exceptions
To begin, some of those who would limit the scope of class actions lean
heavily on the distinction between constitutional sources of law and
subconstitutional sources of law, such as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Their argument draws on the fact that the minimum contacts test

absent class members and the advantages and disadvantages of principled (as opposed to
pragmatic) legal design. See also supra note 26 (discussing the Marcus & Ostrander article).
81. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1285–86; Dodson, supra note 15, at 15.
82. At the outset, it is worth taking pains to define the contours of the argument, as some
litigants (and even courts) have gotten basic questions of BMS’s application wrong. See
Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 219. The state-border argument arises in class actions
where (1) jurisdiction is permissible over a defendant with respect to a named plaintiff’s
claims, but only on a theory of specific (not general) jurisdiction, and (2) specific jurisdiction
is unavailable for the claims of some portion of unnamed class members under the traditional
minimum contacts test. For simplicity’s sake, this Article occasionally refers to this type of
class action as a “model class.” The hypothetical class action involving Money Corp. in the
introduction is an illustration of one such model class.
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is a constitutional requirement for safeguarding defendants’ rights.83 As a
result, the argument goes, any legal rules from subconstitutional authority,
like the common law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, must yield in
the face of a conflicting constitutional command.84 Because the rules
governing class actions arise from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
various judge-made doctrines interpreting them, nothing about how a
proceeding is brought—i.e., whether as a class action or otherwise—can
override the constitutional command that absent class members’ claims must
satisfy the minimum contacts test. This argument is sometimes bolstered by
reference to the text of the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.”85
This argument gets some things right and some things wrong. It is
obviously right that where the Constitution commands a result, a lesser
authority that commands a contrary result is overridden. But where the
argument errs is in assuming that the procedural exceptions that are carved
out for representative litigation are subconstitutional. In fact, the case law
defining the due process exceptions that are afforded to class actions are not
instances of Rule 23 overriding the Constitution, but are instead examples of
courts defining the scope of a litigant’s due process rights in the specific
context of group representative litigation.86
Take, for instance, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansberry v. Lee.87
Decided in 1940, shortly after the emergence of the modern Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Hansberry recognized the “principle of general application”
dating back to Pennoyer that “one is not bound by a judgment in personam
in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process.”88 But, the Court said, “a ‘class’ or
‘representative’ suit” was “a recognized exception” to those rules “to an
extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion.”89 In such a suit, “some
members of the class are parties,” and they “may bind members of the class
or those represented who were not made parties to it.”90 The Court noted
that, in addition to the long pedigree of class actions in particular, the broader
notion that someone “may be bound by [a] judgment where they are in fact
83. See, e.g., Leppert v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., No. 18-C-4347, 2019 WL 216616,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2019) (“[A] defendant’s due process rights should remain constant
regardless of the suit against him, be it an individual, mass, or class action.”); Mussat v. IQVIA
Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018), rev’d and remanded,
953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020).
84. See, e.g., Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d
840, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Rule 23’s [class action] requirements must be interpreted in
keeping with Article III constraints . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997))).
85. Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d at 861 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b)).
86. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809–12 (1985).
87. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
88. Id. at 40.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id.
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adequately represented by parties who are present” was “familiar doctrine,”
citing several nonclass cases in which individuals had been deemed bound
by prior judgments even though they had not been parties because the named
litigants could be considered to represent their interests.91
Hansberry provides a useful model for how to think about exceptions to
constitutional requirements. Hansberry acknowledged the restrictions of due
process but also noted that the traditions of representative litigation had
carved out an exception.92 Then, when evaluating the contours of that
exception, the Hansberry Court looked to the broad values underlying the
relevant constitutional provision rather than laying out a specific rule: There
would be “a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said
that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of
absent parties who are to be bound by it.”93 Hansberry thus affirmed that
due process’s requirements may be distinct in the context of group
representative litigation, and also indicated that the contours of class
litigations’ exceptions can be determined not through applying traditional
tests mechanically but instead by considering broader, more standard-like
concerns such as fair treatment.
Decades later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.94 As background to Shutts, Rule 23 underwent a
number of significant changes in 1966 and emerged in a form close to what
it is today.95 In particular, the new Rule 23(b)(3) permitted courts to issue
binding judgments in class actions on the basis of common questions of law
or fact shared by all class members, even if there was no preexisting
association between the members or common fund that the members had
claim to.96 This revision created due process concerns for cases adjudicated
91. Id. at 43 (first citing Plumb v. Goodnow’s Adm’r, 123 U.S. 560, 560 (1887); then
citing Confectioners’ Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. Racine Engine & Mach. Co., 163 F. 914, 919 (E.D.
Wis. 1908), aff’d, 170 F. 1021 (7th Cir. 1909); and then citing Bryant Elec. Co. v. Marshall,
169 F. 426, 427 (D. Mass. 1909), aff’d, 185 F. 499 (1st Cir. 1911)).
92. Id. at 41.
93. Id. at 42. The Court went on to specify that states’ procedures must be “so devised
and applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent and that the
litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue.” Id.
at 43. But more broadly, this language suggested an expansive potential reach of the class
device, beyond the limits of what was then provided for in Rule 23. See Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class
Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1944 (1998). That rule had permitted class actions to bind
absent parties only in cases that would have otherwise required the joinder of those absent
parties as necessary parties. Id. at 1937–38 (discussing the 1938 version of Rule 23). By
holding that adequate representation was the only relevant due process concern for class
actions’ ability to bind, the Court approved the consistency of “common question” class
actions, a potentially much broader category, with due process requirements. Id. at 1943–44;
see also David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 601 (2013) (noting that the constraints of the 1938
version of Rule 23 “made sleight of hand necessary for courts to realize the broad potential of
Hansberry v. Lee, which allowed res judicata for any judgment, provided the class members
had received adequate representation”).
94. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
95. See Marcus, supra note 93, at 588.
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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under Rule 23 and its state court analogues, including concerns about
personal jurisdiction in particular. A split among state courts developed as
to whether they could constitutionally issue judgments that would bind
out-of-state absent class members in a common-question class action, or
whether the absence of personal jurisdiction over those class members
prohibited such binding judgments.97 The Supreme Court stepped in in
Shutts, a case arising out of a state-court class action, to resolve this issue.
Shutts held explicitly that out-of-state unnamed members in the kind of
plaintiff classes enabled by Rule 23(b)(3) and its analogues do not need to
have minimum contacts with a forum for that forum’s courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to their claims.98 Shutts considered
the issue from the perspective of the absent class members’ rights and
interests, and noted that while the minimum contacts standard is designed to
protect defendants, absent plaintiff class members are differently situated.99
They are protected by the requirement of adequate representation and are not
burdened by the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the same way a named
defendant is burdened.100 Shutts therefore held that protecting absent class
members’ due process rights in Rule 23(b)(3) litigation requires only that
they receive notice and an opportunity to opt out of the class action, along
with the preexisting requirement of adequate representation acknowledged
in Hansberry.101
Shutts thus affirmed the ability of class actions in state and federal court to
operate outside the minimum contacts paradigm established in International
Shoe, albeit with increased due process protections for absent class members
in the (b)(3) context. Shutts also addressed the horizontal federalism
concerns that might arise in a multistate class action, holding that the Due
Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause prevent an “arbitrary” or
“fundamentally unfair” application of state law in a given case by requiring
some sort of “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts”
between the defendant and the state whose law is applied.102
These two cases—Shutts and Hansberry—are important here for two
reasons. The first is their substantive holdings: they each affirm that the
requirements of due process are different when it comes to absent class
members in representative litigation. The second is the model that they
provide for approaching questions at the intersection of the constitutional due
process inquiry and the exceptions and limitations of representative
litigation.
In deciding the contours of the different treatment of
representative litigation, they refer to core due process considerations, such
as notice, the ability of parties to protect their interests, a fair weighing of

97. See Katz v. NVF Co., 100 A.D.2d 470, 474–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (discussing
split); Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., 470 N.Y.S.2d 507, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (same).
98. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985).
99. Id. at 809–11.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 811–12.
102. Id. at 818.
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benefits and burdens, and a balance of power between the states.103 In doing
so, they resist the mechanical application of preexisting doctrinal tests in
favor of more flexible standards that are adapted to the specific needs of
aggregate litigation while being conscientious of individual rights.104
Bearing these cases in mind, the state boundary question is thus not a
question about which rule of law wins in a conflict between Rule 23 and the
Due Process Clause—a question that is answered as soon as it is asked.
Instead, it is a question about the scope of due process rights, and in
particular, how those rights apply in the context of representative
litigation.105 And that question is far from clearly answered by existing case
law. But, as the following sections will show, there is a strong case to be
made that courts do not need to apply the minimum contacts test with respect
to the claims of every absent class member to legitimately exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant.

103. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41–46; Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808–23. As noted, Shutts,
Hansberry, and many of the other cases discussed above focused on the due process rights of
the absent class members themselves—not on the due process rights of named defendants in
plaintiff class actions. Part IV considers how the same basic approach suggested by these
cases—an examination of the core values of due process in light of the goals and advantages
of representative litigation—should apply when the rights of those defendants are at issue.
104. Hansberry and Shutts also demonstrate that at least when it comes to the due process
rights protected by personal jurisdiction doctrine, it is not entirely accurate to say that Rule 23
“like traditional joinder . . . leaves . . . parties’ legal rights and duties intact.” Spencer, supra
note 14, at 44–45 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S.
393, 408 (2010) (Scalia, J.)). For instance, Shutts establishes that Rule 23, by permitting
representative litigation, changes the normal rights of absent class members, allowing courts
to resolve their claims without their consent, and requiring affirmative steps from them to opt
out even if they are outside the court’s territorial power. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1986) (“Absence of power to compel appearance logically is
inconsistent with power to compel a binding choice through the compulsory filing of a paper
with the court. Furthermore, class notices are not comparable in effectiveness to service of
process.”); see also Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40–41 (noting normal constitutional due process
requirements that do not apply in representative suits). So although Rule 23 may not “itself
provide[] the relevant jurisdictional rule,” Spencer, supra note 14, at 44, Shutts and Hansberry
show that Rule 23 can, by authorizing representative litigation, affect parties’ due process
rights in a way that is relevant to the determination of a court’s jurisdictional power.
105. This Article refers to defendants’ “due process rights” and the “due process concerns”
raised in the state-border argument because the Due Process Clause is understood to be the
source of personal jurisdiction doctrine. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct.,
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017). But that is not to say that the concerns raised by personal
jurisdiction doctrines are reducible to or contiguous with procedural due process concerns,
such as notice and the opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Effron, supra note 15, at 26 (“Personal
jurisdiction encompasses doctrines and concepts that are not natural or obvious fits with due
process.”). Many view the protections that are afforded by personal jurisdiction doctrine to
be best understood as examples of substantive due process, not procedural due process. See,
e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987); Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567
(2007); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617 (2006). For a contrary view, namely that the due process clause helps enforce
personal jurisdiction rules but should not determine their content, see Stephen E. Sachs,
Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017).
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B. Distinguishing Between Defendants and Plaintiffs
A second approach to the question of class actions’ boundaries is to focus
on the distinction between plaintiffs’ due process rights and defendants’ due
process rights. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shutts addressed the rights
of absent class member plaintiffs,106 while the question raised by the
state-border argument is about the rights of defendants facing a class action.
To some, the distinction between plaintiffs and defendants in this context is
the whole ball game.107
This argument again gets some things right and some wrong. To start with,
it is right to find this distinction meaningful. Shutts reasoned that due process
generally requires stronger protection for defendants than it does for
plaintiffs because defendants usually have more at stake.108 Plaintiffs
typically consent to jurisdiction, and the safeguards required by Shutts—
notice and a chance to opt out—in some ways mimic that consent for absent
plaintiffs in the class context.109 This reasoning does not obviously extend
to permit jurisdiction over a nonconsenting defendant, and the mechanism
that Shutts provides for protecting absent plaintiffs’ claims has nothing to do
with the due process rights of defendants.110 So there is a meaningful
distinction between plaintiffs and defendants in this context.
But the argument goes too far by positing that the switched focus of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry from the rights of absentee plaintiffs to the
rights of defendants is, alone, enough to conclude that the minimum contacts
test applies to absent class members and that BMS therefore prohibits the
exercise of jurisdiction over those absent class members in many class
actions. The argument thus assumes the premise that it must prove: that the
rules of personal jurisdiction, and in particular the minimum contacts test,
apply with respect to defendants the same way in group representative
litigation as in normal litigation. This argument—that we know that BMS
applies to render jurisdiction impermissible in the model class action because
that is what the minimum contacts test indicates should happen—is, at best,
a tautology.
106. 472 U.S. 797, 807–08 (1985).
107. See, e.g., Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Class Definition
Asserting Claims on Behalf of Non-Ill.-Residents at 10, Am.’s Health & Res. Ctr., Ltd. v.
Alcon Lab’ys, Inc., No. 16-cv-4539, 2018 WL 8667925, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2018); see
also Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 862 (N.D.
Ill. 2018) (“Here, by contrast, defendants are asserting an improper exercise of personal
jurisdiction over them with respect to nonresident class members’ claims. Shutts does not
speak to this argument.”).
108. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806–12.
109. Id. at 812–13. Shutts has long been criticized for creating a veneer of consent in the
absence of actual consent. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 104, at 17; Wood, supra note
31, at 620 (“The Shutts consent finesse, whereby consent can be inferred from a failure to opt
out, does violence to the general theory of consent.”). To the extent Shutts must be read as
changing the rights of absent class members rather than merely creating a specific mechanism
by which they may consent to jurisdiction, that supports the conclusion that the content of due
process rights may be altered by the context of representative litigation. See supra note 104.
110. See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Class Definition
Asserting Claims on Behalf of Non-Ill.-Residents, supra note 107.
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Instead, it is only possible to draw a milder conclusion: that Shutts does
not speak definitively either way as to what due process requires with respect
to defendants’ rights, because its exceptions to the norms of minimum
contacts for absent class members did not explicitly include a consideration
of the minimum contacts test when defendants’ due process rights are
invoked. But it is a significant step from there to argue that when defendants’
due process rights are invoked the minimum contacts test applies as usual.
The remainder of this Article argues that such a step is not warranted.111
As this part has demonstrated, the question of class actions’ boundaries
cannot be answered simply by invoking the Constitution’s authority over the
federal rules or by the acknowledgment that it is defendants’ rights that are
at issue rather than plaintiffs’ rights. Instead, something more is needed—an
account of the way that a defendant’s due process rights should be viewed in
light of the traditional exceptions accorded to representative litigation. The
following sections build that account. They follow the lead of Hansberry
and Shutts, examining both the unique traditions and goals of representative
litigation as well as the constitutional concerns underlying the state-border
argument. Only by evaluating the jurisdictional question at this level—the
level of the foundational constitutional concerns of personal jurisdiction
doctrine—is it possible to avoid starting from the assumption that due
process for defendants in a class action requires applying the same test with
respect to the claims of unnamed class members as the one that applies to the
claims of named parties.
III. REPRESENTATION AND TERRITORIAL POWER
A core distinction of class litigation is that it is representative litigation.
Representation allows one person to stand in court on behalf of another or a
group of others. Representative litigation carries with it both advantages and
risks; the doctrinal history of representative litigation is full of cases in which
courts attempt to balance these advantages and risks. This effort to take
advantage of representative litigation’s benefits while limiting its costs is the
balancing act displayed in cases like Hansberry, Shutts, and others, which
have facilitated class actions while respecting fundamental constitutional
values.
When it comes to the question of class actions’ boundaries, then, a key
question is whether the fact that class actions are representative litigation
makes a difference to the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Many courts that
have rejected the state-border argument have done so on the grounds that
unnamed class members are different from normal litigants in some way—a
justification that implicitly or explicitly relies on representation, given that
the main difference between unnamed class members and named litigants is
the fact that unnamed class members are represented by a class

111. See infra Parts III, IV; see also infra notes 195–96 (discussing historical instances
where representative litigation created exceptions to usual litigation rules even where
defendants’ interests were invoked).
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representative.112 As for those who favor the state-border argument, some
have explicitly rejected the notion that absent class members are
meaningfully different from named plaintiffs,113 while others have not
addressed this potential distinguishing feature of class actions.114
This part examines the nature of representation, arguing that traditional
understandings of representative litigation support the rejection of the
state-border argument. The part begins by discussing the exceptions to
business-as-usual afforded by representation in general, and then examines
the treatment of absent class members in particular.
The part makes two main arguments. The first looks outside the realm of
personal jurisdiction to make an analogy regarding the treatment of absent
class members. The treatment of absent class members when it comes to
issues other than personal jurisdiction suggests that, when it comes to
personal jurisdiction, it would be more consistent to apply the minimum
contacts test only to the claims of class representatives. Courts have often
been asked in other contexts, such as subject matter jurisdiction or venue, to
determine whether a group of plaintiffs can invoke a court’s power. And
when they have evaluated those questions, courts tend to apply the relevant
doctrinal tests to the claims of the named plaintiffs without treating unnamed
112. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 17, at 215–19. These justifications have not always been
particularly deep—a court may note, for instance, that unnamed class members have been
treated as normal litigants for some purposes but not for others, and not explain in any depth
why the minimum contacts inquiry should fall on one side of the line or the other. See, e.g.,
Fabricant v. Fast Advance Funding, LLC, No. 17-cv-05753, 2018 WL 6920667, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018); Feller v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-01378, 2017 WL
6496803, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
113. See, e.g., Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 26, 2018), rev’d and remanded, 953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020).
114. See generally Spencer, supra note 14. Professor Spencer’s essay is one of the most
thorough post-BMS discussions of how courts should treat the claims of unnamed class
members. But his discussion does not consider the possibility that claims adjudicated via
representation should be treated differently for jurisdictional purposes than claims added to a
case through other mechanisms, such as the joinder of additional named parties. The essay
does discuss cases such as Devlin and Ben-Hur to establish that “[n]o Supreme Court case
regards absent class members as parties joined in the action filed by a putative class
representative.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). But it then goes on to consider the claims of
absent class members in a certified class action largely by assuming that the same
jurisdictional analysis applies to those claims as would apply to the claims of named parties.
Id. at 39–51. For instance, Spencer argues that the territorial limits imposed on federal courts
by Rule 4(k) should be applied to unnamed class members, but relies entirely on analogies to
the rules governing the addition of new named parties to an action or the addition of new
claims brought by an existing named party. Id. at 43–44. Similarly, after noting that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Shutts demonstrates that due process puts a “limit on the ability
of a court to render a binding judgment with respect to the claims of absent class members,”
id. at 40, Spencer invokes the same due process rules, i.e. the minimum contacts test, as those
that exist in nonrepresentative litigation. Id. at 47–48 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen and
BMS). But, as discussed above, Shutts and other cases such as Hansberry suggest that the
scope of a person’s due process rights may be different in representative litigation than in
traditional litigation. See supra Part II (discussing Shutts and Hansberry). And this may be
true for defendants as well as for unnamed plaintiff class members. See id.; see also infra Part
III.C (discussing the historical analogy to defendants’ invocation of the necessary party rule).
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plaintiffs as parties. Such a principle suggests that when it comes to
questions of personal jurisdiction, courts should likewise look to the named
plaintiff or plaintiffs as the relevant party and not to unnamed class members.
The second argument looks to the question of territorial limits on courts’
power in particular. Although no historical case or practice squarely resolves
the question of whether the minimum contacts test should apply to absent
class members, class actions and their precursors have for centuries allowed
courts to adjudicate disputes involving far-flung individuals who reside
beyond the courts’ geographic power or whose whereabouts are entirely
unknown. This geographic exceptionalism has long been a part of the
tradition of class litigation and its precursors, and at times has been explicitly
embraced as an advantage of group representative litigation. Such a tradition
supports the analogy courts have drawn between personal jurisdiction and
other areas in which only named parties, and not absent class members, must
satisfy normal procedural requirements.
A. Class Actions as Representative Litigation
Class actions are a form of representative litigation, a category of litigation
in which a named representative appears in court on behalf of one or more
other people or entities.115 Several other types of common litigation are
routinely brought through the use of representatives, including executors of
estates, trustees of trusts, guardians of children, shareholders of companies,
and bailees of property.116 As with class actions, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly allow cases to be brought by these types of
representatives “without joining the person” who is being represented.117
And when courts issue judgments in these cases, they typically bind the
represented entity even though that person or corporation was not formally
present in court.118
Although representative litigation is common, it departs from some
fundamental norms in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Legal rulings are
not legislation; part of what it normally means for a court to be engaging in
adjudication is that its judgments bind only those who are before it and who
have had a chance at their day in court to present evidence and argument in
their favor.119 The underlying right to a day in court is bound up in both

115. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons
for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 577 (2011) (noting
that representation “forms the cornerstone of the modern class action and also supports some
forms of nonparty preclusion in nonclass suits”); Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions:
The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1013 (2002).
116. See Lilly, supra note 115, at 1019; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 41 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (noting that “the problems of representation by trustees, executors,
guardians and other conventional fiduciaries are integrated with those in class suit
representation”).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1).
118. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
119. See, e.g., 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4449 (3d ed. 2018) (describing “[o]ur deep-rooted historic tradition that
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procedural due process rights and property rights, as a person’s legal claim
is often regarded as a form of property that a court cannot dispose of without
adjudicatory process.120 But represented parties can be bound by judgments
even when they were not present in court, when they have not had notice of
the suit, or when they are beyond reach of court process.121
The departures of representative litigation are justified by a variety of
benefits that such litigation brings. Allowing representatives to act in a way
that legally binds represented parties allows, for instance, for the creation of
legal mechanisms that can preserve or dispose of interests across both time
and space and separate a legal actor from the beneficiary of a legal action.
Among other things, these mechanisms allow courts and the law to safeguard
and manage the interests of people who cannot look after their own interests
because of age or incapacity, whose whereabouts may be unknown, who have
not yet been born, or who have died.122 It allows for the creation of complex
and flexible legal and commercial institutions and arrangements.123 And it
allows for the resolution of claims too numerous to be joined together or of
claims whose low value would prevent them from being pursued on their
own.124
Representative litigation bolsters these benefits with safeguards designed
to protect the interests of the persons being represented. These safeguards
generally take the form of heightened duties or rules permitting courts to
supervise the representative’s actions. For instance, the fiduciary obligations
of trustees require them generally to act in the interests of the parties that they
are representing when they appear on their behalf in court.125 And in class
actions, the multifaceted requirement of adequate representation places
heightened duties on the class representatives and their counsel and also
empowers courts to take a greater role in supervising class litigation.126
Representative litigation thus shares a common structure and overlapping
justifications across a diverse set of legal contexts. In representative
litigation, additional burdens are placed on a litigant—the representative—in
order to permit exceptions to usual rules that limit judicial power in the name
of individual rights. Representation thus, by its nature, expands court power
by changing the scope of individual rights. This tool is justified with respect
everyone should have his own day in court” and noting that the “presumption that nonparties
are not bound by a judgment . . . draws from the due process right to be heard”).
120. Id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose
in action is a constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the
plaintiffs.”).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1982).
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 2003); see
also infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 intro. note (AM. L. INST. 2003) (noting that
“[a]mong the most important characteristics of the trust device is its flexibility” and describing
the flexibility that arises from the separation of beneficiaries and trustees).
124. See infra Part II.C.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 70 (AM. L. INST. 2007).
126. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); see also Lilly, supra note 115, at
1021–36 (describing the legal tests and court practices designed to ensure that class
representatives act to further the interests of absent class members).
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to the goals of the particular doctrinal area at hand, whether it be trust law’s
goals of permitting the flexible allocation of beneficial interests in property,
guardianship law’s goals of promoting the interests of people who do not
have the capacity to represent themselves,127 or corporate law’s goals of
permitting shareholders to represent the interests of a corporation against
directors that may have engaged in self-dealing.128 As the next two sections
will argue, this general structure of representative litigation creates a basis
for rejecting the state-border argument and allowing multistate class
litigation to proceed based on the relationship between the forum, defendant,
and class representatives alone.
B. The Treatment of Absent Class Members in Other Contexts
To date, class actions’ status as representative litigation has been a
significant basis for rejecting the state-border argument in litigation. Courts
that have declined to adopt the argument have relied, either explicitly or
implicitly, on the mechanics of representative litigation to conclude that
absent class members should be treated differently from normal parties when
it comes to establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant.129 These
holdings have drawn on exceptions to usual procedural requirements that
have been made for absent class members in other contexts, with courts
reasoning that this precedent militates in favor of excepting absent class
members from the usual minimum contacts requirements of personal
jurisdiction doctrine as well.130
As these courts note, absent class members have been treated differently
from normal parties—and excepted from the usual requirements of
litigation—in a variety of contexts.131 For purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction, for instance, before Congress mandated otherwise in the Class
Action Fairness Act132 (CAFA), absent class members’ citizenship was not
considered when assessing whether a federal court had diversity
jurisdiction—and, indeed, the citizenship of absent class members did not
127. See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn & Catheryn Koss, Lawyers for Legal Ghosts: The Legality
and Ethics of Representing Persons Subject to Guardianship, 91 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587
(2016) (describing common trends in guardianship law across a varied legal landscape).
128. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (“[A]
stockholder who brings suit on a cause of action derived from the corporation assumes a
position, not technically as a trustee perhaps, but one of a fiduciary character. He sues, not
for himself alone, but as representative of a class comprising all who are similarly situated.”);
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (describing the purposes of derivative
actions).
129. See, e.g., Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2020) (explicitly
discussing the nature of class actions as representative litigation and declining to apply BMS
to the claims of absent class members); Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819–21
(N.D. Ill. 2018) (discussing case law treating absent class members as nonparties and invoking
the safeguards of adequate representation to explain that those class members “are not parties
for the purpose of constitutional and statutory doctrines governing whether a court has power
to adjudicate their claims”).
130. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447–48; Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 819–21.
131. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447–48; Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 819–21.
132. Class Action Fairness Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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even need to be known when establishing jurisdiction over the named
plaintiffs and the class as a whole.133 This treatment of absent class members
is particularly notable given the constitutional requirement that federal
district courts must have a statutory basis to exercise jurisdiction in any case,
and the Supreme Court’s self-declared practice of reading the general federal
statute authorizing diversity jurisdiction narrowly to require complete
diversity of parties.134
A number of other procedural rules also carve out exceptions in the class
context. Absent class members are not considered for purposes of
determining whether venue is proper.135 And although there is some debate
on the issue among the federal circuits, the “vast majority” of courts treat the
Article III standing inquiry as focused on the class representative and not
requiring a showing that the elements of standing are met with respect to the
claims of every unnamed class member.136 This logic turns on the named
plaintiffs’ status as the class members’ representative: The Article III inquiry
into the named representative’s standing ensures that there is a live case or
controversy, and then the question becomes whether the absent class
members’ interests are sufficiently similar to the named party’s interests for
the named party to adequately represent the absent class members in court.137
Taken together, these examples militate against the state-border argument.
These exceptions arise in the context of doctrines that govern how to
determine whether and which courts have power to hear a particular case—
subject matter jurisdiction, Article III standing, and venue.138 They involve

133. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (“[C]onsidering all class members for
[citizenship] purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions. Nonnamed class
members are, therefore, not parties in that respect.”).
134. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552–54 (2005) (discussing
28 U.S.C. § 1332 and noting that the complete diversity requirement is not compelled by that
statute’s “plain text” or the Constitution). The relevance of the complete diversity requirement
to class litigation has dwindled in recent years due to CAFA’s provision that allows for class
actions with only minimal diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
135. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1757 (4th
ed. 2021) (“The general rule is that only the residence of the named parties is relevant for
determining whether venue is proper.”).
136. See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:3 (5th ed. 2021);
Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Quite simply,
requiring Article III standing of absent class members is inconsistent with the nature of an
action under Rule 23.”). But see Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III
Standing and Absent Class Members, 64 EMORY L.J. 383, 387–91 (2014) (noting a split among
the federal courts of appeals on the issue and arguing that federal courts should be required to
determine that absent class members have standing before certifying a class); Marcus &
Ostrander, supra note 26, at 1534–41 (discussing confusion and disagreement among different
courts’ approaches).
137. “Representative parties who have a direct and substantial interest have standing; the
question whether they may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar,
but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and
adequacy of representation.” 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1785.1 (3d ed. 2018) (collecting cases).
138. See Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Personal
jurisdiction shares a key feature with those other doctrines: each governs a court’s ability,
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constitutional requirements or implicate constitutional concerns. And courts
answer the question of how these doctrines apply to class actions by looking
to the features of the named representatives’ claims and excluding
consideration of the claims of the unnamed class members.
In contrast, in the contexts in which absent class members’ claims are
directly considered and those class members are treated more like parties, the
question is not whether the representative alone is able to invoke the court’s
power on behalf of the class. Absent class members are treated more like
parties in that they are allowed to appeal the approval of a class settlement
without intervening; they are also treated more like parties in that the statute
of limitations on their claims is tolled by the filing of the class action.139
These rules are justified by the need to preserve unnamed class members’
ability to defend their own interests, and to preserve the benefits of class
litigation by avoiding scenarios in which absent class members are often
required to intervene in pending class litigation.140
This general breakdown is, admittedly, imperfect. In particular, when it
comes to mootness—a doctrine that relates to a court’s power to hear a
case—there is an important exception for class actions that does require
courts to examine the claims of unnamed class members. Where a named
representative’s claims become moot, if the claims of unnamed class
members are not themselves mooted, the named representative can continue
the case.141 As David Marcus and Will Ostrander point out, there is therefore
some tension between existing mootness doctrine in class actions, which
finds the claims of unnamed members to be juridically relevant, and the
argument that these claims should not be relevant when it comes to personal
jurisdiction.142
But this disanalogy does not spoil the usefulness of the other doctrinal
examples that were just described. First, the cases establishing the mootness
exception for class actions do not impose additional obligations or tests on
the absent class members; instead, they are designed to excuse a failing by
the named representative, so long as the named representative still satisfies
the requirements of adequate representation. For instance, the mootness
cases do not amount to a holding that all absent class members must have
non-moot claims; to the contrary, the Court’s original discussion of the
mootness exception specifies that the case can go on as long as there is a live
controversy “between a named defendant and a member of the class,” not
every member of the class.143 Second, the mootness exception is
fundamentally driven by an assessment of the goals and policies underlying
the class device and the doctrines of mootness, a functionalist approach that
constitutional or statutory, to adjudicate a particular person’s or entity’s claim against a
particular defendant.”).
139. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002).
140. Id. at 9–11.
141. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013); see also U.S.
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
142. See Marcus & Ostrander, supra note 26, at 1531–44.
143. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (emphasis added).
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can work just as well in the context of personal jurisdiction as in subject
matter jurisdiction. As Marcus and Ostrander argue, such a functionalist
approach can take seriously the fundamental concerns of doctrine while
allowing for different perspectives on absent class members in different
contexts.144
But the fact that the treatment of absent class members may vary from
context to context, and that those differing contexts may implicate different
doctrinal concerns, reinforces the conclusion that answering the state-border
question will require examining courts’ territorial power in particular, rather
than simply analogizing to other areas of law. Although personal jurisdiction
doctrine is also, broadly speaking, about whether courts have power to hear
particular cases, there are specific concerns at play in personal jurisdiction
cases that are not the same as those at play in cases about subject matter
jurisdiction or venue. Personal jurisdiction doctrine focuses on the territorial
nature of courts’ power, not just their power over certain subject matters.
And personal jurisdiction doctrine is also concerned not just with courts’
power in the abstract but also with defendants’ rights to be free from arbitrary
authority. The next section therefore examines historical interactions
between representation and courts’ territorial power. After that, Part IV
focuses on the state-border question from the perspective of defendants’ due
process rights.
C. The Geographic Exceptionalism of Group Representative Litigation
The relaxation of normal adjudicative requirements in the context of group
litigation is well-documented and much-discussed.145 But there is no case,
or set of cases, that squarely outlines the nature and limits of representation
when it comes to courts’ territorial power. And certainly no case before the
last few years considers in depth the state-border question—whether absent
class members’ contacts with a forum state must be considered when
determining whether that forum has jurisdiction over the defendant with
respect to the entirety of a multistate class action.146
But there have been moments throughout the development of class
litigation that provide some insight into the relationship between
representation and territorial boundaries. Class actions and other forms of
group representative litigation have historically been understood to permit
the adjudication of absentees’ claims based on the presence of an adequate
representative, without regard to where those absentees may be and whether
144. See Marcus & Ostrander, supra note 26, at 1545–46.
145. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987); Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990); Abram
Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26
(1982); Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 482 (1998); Hazard et al., supra note 93; Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 718 (2005).
146. See Wolff, supra note 145, at 719 (noting a lack “of any serious engagement with” the
issue in courts before BMS).
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their claims would ordinarily fall within the court’s territory. At times, this
form of doctrinal empowerment has been very explicit—courts have
specifically adopted the representative device because of its ability to extend
their territorial power.147 While this tradition may not, as a doctrinal matter,
provide a definite answer to the state-border question, it supports an
understanding of representation as a tool that expands courts’ territorial reach
beyond what it would otherwise be.
1. The Early Precursors to Class Actions
The early precursors to class litigation in the United States can be found in
the nineteenth century, when courts sitting in equity began applying a version
of equitable group litigation that had originally arisen in England.148
Centuries earlier, in medieval England, litigation in which a few
representatives stood in for a larger group had been relatively common and
was not thought of as unusual or exceptional.149 But by the late seventeenth
century, it was no longer seen as run-of-the-mill to have a few individuals
purport to represent a group in court.150 Instead, this arrangement came to
be seen as a special and unusual form of litigation that required its own
justification.151
In the United States, that justification was developed in large part by
Justice Joseph Story, both as an author of case law and as an author of
treatises.152 A common structure to Justice Story’s justifications was to point
to the dilemmas that courts face when attempting to resolve a dispute
involving a large but indeterminate or difficult-to-find group of people that
is owed money by a common defendant.153 A dilemma existed, Story noted,
because “if the Court were compelled to wait” until “all of [the potential
claimants] were technically parties before the Court,” the challenge “would
be almost insuperable” in many cases.154 Creditors may be “out of the
country” and hence outside the court’s jurisdiction, or they might be
“unascertained,” or the status of the debt dependent on future events.155 In
many situations, such as those involving a common fund of money, a single
creditor would not be permitted to sue for only their single demand without

147. See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156–57 and
accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational
Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 460–61; YEAZELL, supra note 145, at 277.
149. YEAZELL, supra note 145, at 285–90.
150. Id. (describing such groups as “litigative anomalies”).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Wood Hutchinson, supra note 148, at 460–61 (discussing the link between
West v. Randall and the modern class action); YEAZELL, supra note 145, at 277.
153. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS
THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA
§§ 98–99, 111 (2d ed. 1840).
154. Id. § 103.
155. Id.
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bringing other creditors in, because of the “injustice in deciding upon the
extent of their rights and interests in their absence.”156
But permitting a creditor or creditors to sue on behalf of all those similarly
situated would allow the court to resolve legal issues common to all the
creditors and also to create mechanisms to protect the interests of absent
creditors. In these cases, the absent parties were not merely invoked
symbolically or to facilitate the interests of the named parties. To the
contrary, “the rights and interests of the absent party” were, in at least some
sense, “before the Court.”157 Story thus tied the benefits of representative
group litigation explicitly to the ability of courts to adjudicate the rights of
individuals who may be outside their jurisdiction.158
The equitable principles in Story’s treatises were first applied to a major
class action by the U.S. Supreme Court in the pre–Civil War case Smith v.
Swormstedt.159 In Swormstedt, disparate groups of preachers of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, which had fragmented as part of the nationwide
conflict over slavery, sought money from a large fund that had been owned
by the previously unified church.160 The Court allowed the suit to proceed
156. Id.
157. Id. § 96; see also id. § 99 (“But when the Bill is brought on behalf of themselves, and
all others, all creditors are, in a sense, deemed to be before the Court.”).
158. It is important to note the distinction between adjudicating the rights of absent
individuals and binding those individuals via res judicata. Representative group litigation took
a variety of forms, some of which did not always bind absent individuals via preclusion. See,
e.g., Bone, supra note 145, at 231, 233 (noting that representative suits “need not (although
they can) involve binding nonparties in the strong res judicata sense” and that some early
representative suits “had different binding effects on nonparticipating absentees”). It is
difficult to construct an accurate and systematic account of when and why different binding
effects would be present, as there are inconsistencies in the case law persisting across
centuries. See generally Hazard et al., supra note 93. But even where a decree in
representative litigation would not bind absent parties as a matter of res judicata, the use of
the class device and its predecessors still allowed courts to escape meaningful limitations on
their power over absent parties. To begin with, under the highly formal rules of equity, courts
treated absent parties’ legal rights as if they “had an existence and an inherent content
independent of real world consequences.” Bone, supra note 145, at 247 n.78. Courts were
thus prohibited in general from acting in a way that adjudicated these rights of these absent
parties, even if the ultimate result would not bind those parties. Id. at 243–44. But
representative litigation freed them to adjudicate those rights by permitting decrees that could
be comprehensive as to the rights and duties of everyone represented, even absentees. Id.
Additionally, even in the absence of preclusive effects on the substance of absent members’
claims, representative litigation also could have the effect of binding absent members to
certain procedures, such as a prohibition on new actions at law and a requirement to prove
claims before a master. See Hazard et al., supra note 93, at 1869–72 (describing how
representative litigation in the creditor and legatee context could force absent members to
subsequently observe certain legal procedures even if they would not be bound by the initial
action as a matter of res judicata). And absent individuals seeking proceeds from a joint fund
might not be able to challenge the representative litigation’s decree as to the amount of the
fund or the proportion to which other individuals were entitled. Bone, supra note 145, at
267–68 n.130. In this way, even in the absence of formal claim preclusion, representative
suits could still have significant binding effects on absent individuals.
159. 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
160. Id. at 289–300. The Swormstedt Court goes out of its way to ignore the role of the
underlying issue of slavery in the church’s split, mentioning it only as a “cause[] which [] is
not important particularly to refer to.” Id. at 304.
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despite the fact that many interested plaintiffs and defendants were scattered
throughout the country and remained unjoined, invoking Justice Story’s
treatise on equity pleadings and holding that the absent parties could be
represented by the present ones.161
Although Swormstedt does not discuss this mechanism in terms of the
territorial limits on courts’ authority, the surrounding legal context indicates
that Swormstedt’s approval of a nationwide class action was at least an
implicit adoption of a kind of geographic exceptionalism. Swormstedt
upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by a nationwide plaintiff class over a
nationwide defendant class on the basis of representatives of each class who
were before the court.162 But in 1853, the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts was understood to be confined to the territory of the state in which the
court sat.163 As Justice Story himself wrote, Congress’s structuring of federal
courts within state boundaries suggested such a restriction, as there was
understood to be a “general principle, that a court created within and for a
particular territory is bounded in the exercise of its power by the limits of
such territory.”164 Although Congress had the power to extend the reach of
federal courts beyond state lines, it had not done so—the first nationwide
service of process provision was enacted in 1873.165
In the face of the then-accepted territorial limits on courts’ authority,
Swormstedt thus represents an affirmation by the Supreme Court, at least
implicitly, that class actions enabled courts to resolve the claims of
individuals who not only had not been served with process but also could not
be served with process because they were outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. And that geographic exceptionalism in Swormstedt extended
with respect to both plaintiffs and defendants, allowing for the claims of
plaintiffs who were both named and unnamed, inside and outside the court’s
territorial jurisdiction, to be resolved against defendants who were likewise
both inside and outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.166

161. Id. at 299–303.
162. Id. at 303.
163. See Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611 (C.C.D. Mass 1828) (No. 11,134); Ex parte
Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 912 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5657); see also Note, Jurisdiction of
Federal District Courts over Foreign Corporations, 69 HARV. L. REV. 508, 509–10 (1956)
(discussing the history of federal courts’ territorial limitations); Patrick Woolley,
Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56
HOUS. L. REV. 565, 570–73 (2019).
164. Picquet, 19 F. Cas. at 611.
165. Woolley, supra note 163, at 574 n.28.
166. Swormstedt was brought in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Ohio, which was
the home jurisdiction of the Methodist Book Concern, the fund of money that was at issue in
the case and therefore a key defendant. Speaking in the anachronistic terms of International
Shoe, the court can therefore be thought of as having general jurisdiction over the Methodist
Book Concern. But it cannot be thought of as having general jurisdiction over the many other
parties whose rights and interests were adjudicated in the case. The Methodist Episcopal
Church was unincorporated, with its constitutive groups, officials, and members spread
throughout the country. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 298–302. For a critique of the potential
argument that Swormstedt can be viewed as an instance of in rem jurisdiction, see the
discussion infra note 173 and accompanying text. Instead, the jurisdiction asserted over these
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2. The Transition to the Modern Class Action
In between the earliest days of Swormstedt and the development of the
modern class action, two types of cases—insurance fund cases and labor
organization suits—stand out for their emphasis on aggregate litigation’s
ability to extend courts’ powers beyond their borders. Insurance fund cases,
arising frequently in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
involved voluntary associations that had formed to provide insurance to their
members.167 Class actions in state court would purport to bind all association
members nationwide to some dispute, such as a dispute over how to calculate
benefits or interpret a contract term.168 Then a new dispute would form
between the association and some out-of-state member regarding whether
that earlier class action had a binding effect on the out-of-state member.169
If the rule of Pennoyer applied, many absent class members would arguably
have a constitutional right not to be bound: they were not present in the state
that had first addressed the issue and were not served process.
But a string of cases made clear that these sorts of class actions created an
exception to the geographic constraints of Pennoyer, decades before
International Shoe would abandon Pennoyer’s rule completely. The earliest
cases at the U.S. Supreme Court, Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs170 and
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,171 held that the out-of-state members
were bound, and justified their holdings through the logic of representation:
Because class representatives stood in for the interests of all policyholders,
all policyholders could be bound, even if jurisdiction over them would have
been impermissible in an individual suit.172 The insurance fund cases thus
represent a continuation and elaboration of the geographic exceptionalism
that began with Justice Story and Swormstedt, in which the mechanism of
representation allows a court to make binding judgments that reach beyond
the territorial limitations that would otherwise apply.173
various other parties would be most analogous to specific jurisdiction, based on the existence
of the Methodist Book Concern and its connection to the claims at issue in the case.
167. See, e.g., Hazard et al., supra note 93, at 1926–37 (discussing several mutual-benefit
organization cases to make it to the Supreme Court and describing “a flood of such suits
against various fraternal benefit associations”).
168. See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 665–66 (1915).
169. Id.
170. 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
171. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
172. See id. at 367; Hartford Life Ins. Co., 237 U.S. at 672.
173. Perhaps because of the emphasis in Cauble and Ibs on the need for states to be able to
control entities within their borders, some have explained the insurance fund cases as justified
by in rem jurisdiction, saying that the state courts were permitted to exercise their authority
and bind those outside its jurisdiction because they had territorial power over the particular
property involved—the fund or the corporate entity that controlled the fund. See, e.g., Grimes
v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1568 (3d Cir. 1994) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting);
Deborah Deitsch-Perez, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in the Certification of
Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 539–
40 (1983). But this explanation is essentially a post hoc rationalization. The class actions
underlying the cases were not denominated as actions in rem but instead were in personam
actions based on contractual rights. See Dresser v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 70 A. 39, 46 (Conn.
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Over the next few decades, another category of cases—lawsuits against
unincorporated labor organizations—continued to illustrate the territorial
power of representative litigation.174 Suing a union could be difficult or
impossible in some circumstances without using the class device to get
around state boundaries. Some states’ laws did not permit suing an
unincorporated organization as an entity.175 Suing the unions’ members or
leadership, meanwhile, could be difficult because many of them might reside
outside the court’s territory and have little or no connection to the forum state
(particularly if the union was a national organization).176 But if personal
jurisdiction could be obtained over one or a few adequate representatives, a
class could be certified that encompassed the entire organization via
representation, enabling individuals to effectively sue the union.177 This
enabled suits like the one in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen,178 in which a group of Black workers sued a union for
refusing to admit Black members.179
Federal courts explicitly noted the value of this mechanism where “it is not
possible for the plaintiff to serve process on [an] association within a
convenient jurisdiction.”180 In this way, the geographic flexibility of class
litigation—allowing courts to hear important disputes involving far-flung
parties—was a specific feature deployed to manage, in Judge John Minor
Wisdom’s words, “[t]he dead hand of the common law” that, if “carried to
its logical extreme,” would give “virtual immunity” to unincorporated
associations.181 As with the insurance fund cases, class actions’ geographic
flexibility allowed courts to advance goals not only of efficiency and efficacy
but also of accountability and law enforcement—permitting the substantive
law to reach entities that might not otherwise be accountable in court. The
time period leading up to the emergence of the modern class action thus
suggests that the geographic exceptionalism of representative litigation was
alive and well.

1908); see also Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1954)
(“[T]he class action [in Ibs] was not a proceeding in rem with the res before the state court;
the fund was relevant only in determining rights in personam based on a contract.”). The class
action whose binding effect on out-of-state absent members was affirmed in Ibs, for instance,
was brought not as an in rem action but with the traditional invocation of a suit brought on
behalf of “all other similarly situated” holders of certificates in the insurance company’s
policy. See Dresser, 70 A. at 46. Neither that case nor Ibs itself even referred to in rem
jurisdiction, despite the fact that if in rem jurisdiction were available, it would have neatly
resolved the whole dispute, which centered on whether the exercise of jurisdiction had been
permissible.
174. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 148 F.2d 403,
404–05 (4th Cir. 1945) (collecting cases).
175. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 186–87 (8th Cir. 1948)
(discussing Missouri law).
176. See, e.g., Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 255–56 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.).
177. See Tunstall, 148 F.2d at 405; Calagaz, 309 F.2d at 259; Langer, 168 F.2d at 187–88.
178. 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945).
179. Id. at 404.
180. Id. at 405; see also Calagaz, 309 F.2d at 252 (quoting Tunstall, 148 F.2d at 405).
181. Calagaz, 309 F.2d at 251–52.
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3. The Modern Class Action
The modern class action began in 1966, when Rule 23 underwent
significant amendments and emerged in a form close to what it is today.182
For many, the modern form of the class action enabled by this rule and its
state court analogues brought with it the geographic exceptionalism of the
past without incident. Federal courts, for instance, continued to exercise
jurisdiction over class members outside state boundaries, just as they had in
the insurance fund cases or labor organization cases described above.183 As
one federal district court put it in 1976, “there is never a question that a court
entertaining a proper class action has power to adjudicate the rights of class
members even if they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court when
served with notice of the pendency of the action.”184 Other courts and
commenters made similar statements.185
But there were some who questioned that stance, focusing on the ability of
the newly established (b)(3)-style class actions to bind out-of-state members
to a judgment.186 The Supreme Court stepped in to address these issues in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.187 As discussed above, Shutts considered
the issue from the perspective of the absent class members’ rights and
interests, and held that out-of-state unnamed members in a (b)(3)-style
plaintiff class do not need to have minimum contacts with a forum for that
forum to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to their claims.188
But in addition to this holding, Shutts also addressed the horizontal

182. See Marcus, supra note 93, at 588.
183. See id. at 644–45 (noting that “[t]he 1985 decision in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts
approved a jurisdictional understanding about which, at least in the federal courts, there was
‘never any question’ in the 1970s”).
184. Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 413 F. Supp. 88, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
185. See Andrea R. Martin, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class: A Problem
of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1435 (1974) (“[W]hen a federal court is initially
satisfied that the due process requirements of adequate representation and notice can be met,
it may properly exercise jurisdiction over the entire class. This is true whether or not there are
class members outside of the court’s normal jurisdictional boundaries.”); Advert. Special.
Nat’l Ass’n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 1956) (“[I]n a proper class suit the fact that
all members of the class are not within the jurisdiction of the court where the suit is tried does
not exempt foreign members from the judgment.”). At least one state court held a similar
stance. See English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 254 S.E.2d 223, 229 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(“The fact that some members of the class are located outside the court’s jurisdiction does not
prevent the institution of a class action so long as there are class members within the
jurisdiction who adequately represent those outside.” (citing Vann v. Hargett, 22 N.C. (2 Dev.
& Bat. Eq.) 31, 36 (1838))).
186. See Barbara A. Winters, Jurisdiction over Unnamed Plaintiffs in Multistate Class
Actions, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 181, 181–83 (1985); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 362 A.2d 1177,
1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (noting that “there are . . . cases where a state’s interest
in the litigation has been deemed of such magnitude that it can exercise jurisdiction over
nonresident class members” but declining to exercise jurisdiction on that basis); Katz v. NVF
Co., 100 A.D.2d 470, 474–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (discussing the split among courts). This
Article uses “(b)(3)-style class actions” to refer to both those actions brought under Rule
23(b)(3) and those brought under analogous state procedural rules.
187. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
188. Id. at 811–12.
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federalism concerns that might arise in a multistate class action. Shutts
involved a suit by a class of royalty owners who claimed that Phillips
Petroleum owed them interest on royalty payments attached to oil leases.189
The royalty owners sued in Kansas state court, but less than 3 percent of the
plaintiff class members and less than 1 percent of the property involved in
the suit were in Kansas.190
Kansas courts had decided to apply Kansas’s law to the class action as a
whole, but the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that approach.191 The Court held
that the Due Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause prevent an
“arbitrary” or “fundamentally unfair” application of state law in a given case
by requiring some sort of “significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts” between the defendant and the state whose law is applied.192 It
held that the application of Kansas law to claims that were unrelated to
Kansas conflicted with these limits.193
Shutts thus incorporated personal jurisdiction’s traditional concerns over
the fair treatment of defendants and the equal dignity of the states into the
doctrine governing the territorial breadth that class actions had, by that time,
provided to courts for generations. It showed that these concerns could be
addressed not only by doctrines grounded in constitutional due process but
also in the protections of horizontal federalism provided for by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. As we will see in the next section, these protections are
relevant when considering the horizontal federalism implications of the
state-border argument.
As noted above, the cases in this section do not establish or reject the
state-border argument as a clear-cut matter of doctrinal precedent. But they
do inform the underlying question of how the traditional understanding of
representative litigation intersects with the question of courts’ territorial
power. Group representative litigation has long allowed courts to adjudicate
disputes involving far-flung individuals whose location is unknown. This
feature has been a self-conscious part of courts’ approach to group
representative litigation, having been explicitly embraced in case law and
treatise for centuries. Such a history provides reason to reject the state-border
argument and allow courts to hear multistate class actions like the model
class.
The cases also affirm a core point discussed above in Part II—that the
state-border argument does not straightforwardly follow from the fact that
defendants’ rights, not absent plaintiffs’ rights, are at issue. To the contrary,
the procedural exceptions invoked in representative litigation have applied
even where the traditional rules would have benefited defendants—the
exceptions, in other words, were not just used to get around barriers posed
by the rights of absent plaintiffs. Objections to the validity of representative
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 799.
Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 822–23.

1646

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

litigation have frequently been raised by defendants seeking to defend their
own interests. In Swormstedt and West v. Randall,194 for instance, the
defendants were the ones raising the objection that the bill lacked necessary
parties.195 The same was true of various old English cases cited by Justice
Story in his treatise on equity pleadings.196 From the early days of
representative litigation, then, the exceptions that have been made from the
rules of personal jurisdiction have created additional risks and burdens for
named defendants in addition to absent parties. The exception to the
necessary party rule thus provides a model for how the exception to the
minimum contacts rule could work—an exception that applies across the
board where there is adequate representation, regardless of whose interests
are considered.
The application of the exceptions in these cases makes sense: rules
requiring necessary parties to be joined protected both those absent parties’
interests and also the defendant’s interest in avoiding conflicting or
duplicative judgments (as well as in resolving multiple claims more
efficiently in one case). The benefits that justified the exception to the
normal rule would be in a precarious position if they did not apply regardless
of who sought to invoke the usual requirements. Similarly, as discussed in
more detail below, the reasons that have historically justified class actions’
geographic exceptionalism apply strongly even when a defendant’s rights are
at issue.
IV. THE STATE-BORDER ARGUMENT AND DEFENDANTS’ DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
As discussed in Part II, answering the state-border question requires
developing an account of how a defendant’s due process rights operate in the
context of representative litigation, a form of litigation that has at times been
understood to alter the requirements of due process. Part III examined
representation in the context of absent class members and territorial
limitations in particular, finding that the treatment of absent class members
in other contexts and the history of representation in the context of territorial
limitations both militate against the state-border argument.
But representative litigation is only part of the equation. The traditions
and uses of representative litigation would not be enough to justify rejecting
the state-border argument on their own, if exercising jurisdiction in classes
like the model class were a violation of due process. This part therefore
considers the exercise of jurisdiction in the model class in light of the due
process concerns that have animated personal jurisdiction doctrine since
Pennoyer. In particular, it examines the fairness of the additional burden to
the defendant of this exercise of jurisdiction and the potential horizontal
194. 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424).
195. Id. at 721; Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853).
196. See STORY, supra note 153, § 98 n.2; see also Good v. Blewitt (1807) 33 Eng. Rep.
343 (Ch.) (defendant objects for want of parties); Leigh v. Thomas (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 201
(Ch.) (defendant files demurrer for want of parties).
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federalism concerns that might arise. This part argues that applying the
minimum contacts test to only the named plaintiffs’ claims in a multistate
class action does not run afoul of these fundamental concerns. And, going
further, it argues that some of the core underlying concerns of personal
jurisdiction doctrine—concerns of horizontal federalism—affirmatively
counsel against adopting the state-border argument.
A. Fairness
A main concern of personal jurisdiction doctrine—perhaps “the primary
concern,” to use BMS’s recent reformulation—is the fairness of subjecting a
defendant to the burdens of litigation in the forum chosen by the plaintiff.197
This concern underlies the minimum contacts test, which examines whether
a defendant’s contacts with a given jurisdiction justify the burden placed on
it by litigation.198 And it backstops the rest of the jurisdictional inquiry as
well: even in cases where minimum contacts exist, courts must be satisfied
that, considering all the circumstances, the burden placed on the defendant
does not offend traditional notions of fairness.199
Evaluating whether the exercise of jurisdiction is fair does not—and
cannot—mean considering the burden on the defendant in a vacuum. Given
that all litigation imposes some burden, the question must be whether that
burden is justified by other countervailing interests. Those interests have
traditionally included a mix of the plaintiff’s interests and the forum’s
interests: “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,”200 “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,”201 “the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies,”202 and “the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”203
In multistate class actions, these interests will typically weigh strongly in
favor of exercising jurisdiction. This is true even if the relevant alternative
is not individual litigation but instead maintaining class actions within state
boundaries. Where the standards for class certification are met, a class action
will almost certainly be more efficient than proliferating cases state by state.
And in some situations there may be too few class members within a state’s
boundaries to make litigation economically feasible, making multistate

197. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776 (2017).
198. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980) (“The
concept of minimum contacts . . . protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment
Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945).
199. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985).
200. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
201. Id. (citing Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
202. Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98).
203. Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98).
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litigation the only realistic way to bring claims.204 Plus, as discussed in more
depth below, states have a variety of interests that weigh in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction in the model class. The values that have supported
class doctrine for centuries continue to do so even when the propriety of
personal jurisdiction is considered with respect to the interests of defendants
rather than absent class members.
There are, of course, interests on the other side of the scale—the
defendant’s interests. Developing an account of how to balance these
interests is difficult and, of necessity, somewhat subjective—there is no
objective scale that we can use to weigh the various due process
considerations. But the case law emphasizes a few distinct concerns as
particularly important and, in contrast, deemphasizes what is likely the most
significant concern for defendants—namely, the increased scope of liability
that they would face in a larger class action. Four factors suggest that the
exercise of jurisdiction in the model class is not impermissibly unfair: the
marginal litigation burdens on the defendant will be low, there is not a
significant foreseeability problem, personal jurisdiction doctrine can retain
an “escape valve” for particularly problematic circumstances, and
jurisdiction has long been permitted under the kinds of facts giving rise to
the model class.
1. Low Marginal Burdens
The marginal litigation burdens on the defendant from permitting
jurisdiction in the model class will be low.205 The state-border question
arises only where a defendant is already subject to personal jurisdiction in
the forum with respect to the named plaintiffs’ claims—because regardless
of whether the state-border argument is adopted, the named representative
will still be required to meet the minimum contacts test. And in all or nearly
all cases, the fact that the named representative satisfies the minimum
contacts test will also mean that the in-state absent class members will also
satisfy the minimum contacts test.206 As a result, the marginal burdens on
the defendant of the exercise of litigation will be low: the defendant will
204. See, e.g., Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70
FLA. L. REV. 499, 551 (2018); Steinman, supra note 15, at 1454–55.
205. The burdens of adding absent, out-of-state class members should be evaluated on the
margin. In cases where a defendant asserts personal jurisdiction defenses against some claims
and not others, the fact that the court has jurisdiction over a defendant for one claim can weigh
in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction over other claims. The doctrine of pendent personal
jurisdiction, for instance, allows courts to assert jurisdiction over defendants in part because
the defendants face a lower marginal burden to defend against those claims than if they had
been brought on their own. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2021).
206. It is conceivable that a class could be defined in such a way that the claims of some
small number of class members who reside in the forum state do not satisfy the minimum
contacts test—for instance, if satisfying the minimum contacts test requires an in-state
purchase of a particular product and some class members live in the state but purchased their
product out of state. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017
(2021).
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already have to hire lawyers, arrange for the travel of witnesses and staff, and
handle all of the other usual burdens that attend litigation. The only question
is what the scope of that defense will be: will it include only claimants with
minimum contacts, or will it include out-of-state unnamed class members as
well?
Notably, this question is different in a class action than in, say, a mass
action such as BMS. The constitutional requirements of adequate
representation in class actions, as well as requirements in the Federal Rules
such as commonality, typicality, and predominance, safeguard the
defendant’s interests against being unduly burdened.207 The additional
claims of out-of-state class members cannot require significantly different
evidentiary presentations or legal arguments, and so the potential additional
burden on the defendant from the exercise of jurisdiction over these claims
is minimized.208 Class actions, by design, are only permitted to proceed
when resolving the claims of class members in one fell swoop is more
efficient than addressing those claims individually—a consideration that is
highly relevant to the jurisdictional calculus of the defendant’s litigation
burdens.
Although these litigation efficiencies are relevant to the jurisdictional
inquiry, the increased liability that the defendant faces should not be part of
the calculus. When a class action is increased by a significant number of
people, a defendant’s primary concern is not likely to be the increased cost
of evidentiary presentations—it will probably be the increased potential
liability that it faces. But a defendant’s contacts with a forum state weigh the
same for purposes of personal jurisdiction whether the liability at stake is ten
dollars or ten million dollars.209 In other words, the personal jurisdiction
inquiry does not regard increased liability as an increased burden when it
comes to assessing the appropriateness of jurisdiction. Although this aspect
of jurisdictional doctrine may seem odd, given its incongruence with what
many defendants are most likely to care about, it makes sense when one
considers that the relevant inquiry is jurisdictional in nature and therefore
focused on the legitimate reach of authority rather than the substantive
burdens of whatever regulations that authority may be enforcing. So
although, for practical purposes, a defendant’s concern about the state-border
question may focus on the increased scope of liability it faces with larger
class actions, that concern does not sound in personal jurisdiction doctrine.

207. Judge L. Scott Coogler used similar reasoning to conclude that BMS does not apply to
class actions in Jones v. Depuy Synthes Products, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 310 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
208. There may be a slight complication where variations in state law result in the need to
use subclasses or to engage in a choice-of-law inquiry that would not otherwise be necessary,
as discussed below. But out-of-state class members’ claims cannot vary significantly from the
class representatives’ claims without thwarting the availability of the class device to begin
with. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
209. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 n.23 (1977) (“The fairness of
subjecting a defendant to state-court jurisdiction does not depend on the size of the claim being
litigated.”).
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2. No Significant Foreseeability Concern
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has long been concerned with helping
potential defendants order their affairs ex ante. This concern comes up in
multiple ways—part of the goal of the post–International Shoe doctrine is
ensuring that defendants have clear notice as to where they will be subject to
suit,210 and one of the key rationales for the purposeful availment test is that
a defendant who purposefully avails itself of a given forum can reasonably
expect to have to answer in that forum for disputes that arise out of its
forum-directed activity.211
This concern provides some potential grounds for the state-border
argument. A defendant could accurately point out that a multistate class
action would allow one state’s courts to resolve claims against a defendant
that arose out of activity in another state. As a result, the defendant could
argue, multistate class actions prevent defendants from knowing where they
will be subject to suit for their activity in any one place. If a defendant sells
20,000 widgets in Texas, for instance, claims arising from those widgets
could be litigated not only in Texas but also as part of a class action in
Oregon, Florida, or any other state.
This objection loses steam, however, for two reasons. First, the
availability of multistate class actions does not mean that a defendant will be
subject to suit in any state whatsoever. A defendant that wishes to avoid a
particular forum can still avoid engaging in activity directed toward that
forum—class representatives must satisfy the minimum contacts test,
preventing class actions from arising where a defendant has intentionally
avoided engaging in activity. Second, choice-of-law rules, which often look
to the law of the state with the most significant connections to a dispute, will
in many instances preserve defendants’ ability to order their conduct with a
reasonable degree of foreseeability as to what kind of liability they may
face.212 These choice-of-law rules are backstopped by the constitutional
requirements established in Shutts, which prevent states from too
aggressively applying their own laws across the board in class actions. If a
defendant sells twenty widgets in Oregon and 20,000 in Texas, an Oregon
court cannot apply Oregon law to the claims of the thousands of Texan class
members.213
As a result, even without adopting the state-border argument, defendants
still have a large degree of control over (and therefore can foresee) their
potential liability. They will only be subject to suit in locations that they have
purposefully availed themselves of, involving conduct that, by the nature of
class litigation, will be largely the same with respect to every class member.
And they will still be able to organize their ex ante conduct in a way that
leaves them reasonably assured of which laws will govern their conduct, as
210. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see also
Effron, supra note 15, at 104.
211. Effron, supra note 15, at 65 (describing and critiquing this rationale).
212. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. L. INST. 1971).
213. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
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choice-of-law rules (and the Constitution) limit the ability of states to apply
their own laws to unrelated out-of-forum activity.
3. The “Overall Reasonableness” Option for Declining Jurisdiction
The considerations discussed in this subsection so far have been broad and
general, regarding the mine run of multistate class actions. But personal
jurisdiction doctrine contains a rule that might be thought of as a useful
escape valve for any situation in which the exercise of personal jurisdiction
does not run afoul of any bright-line rule but nonetheless seems problematic.
That is the provision that is sometimes referred to as the “overall
reasonableness” requirement, exemplified in the third prong of the usual
specific-jurisdiction test: even if there are minimum contacts, and even if the
claim arises from those contacts, a defendant still should not be subject to
personal jurisdiction where, given all the circumstances, exercising
jurisdiction would undermine traditional notions of fair play and substantive
justice.214
This requirement of overall reasonableness is useful when considering the
state-border question because it provides a doctrinal mechanism for
prohibiting jurisdiction in an extreme scenario that seems excessively
burdensome or unfair. If one rejects the state-border argument, for instance,
it might in theory be possible for a large nationwide class action to be
conducted in a state where there was a single injured person, if that person
were the named plaintiff. The standards for class certification might well
prevent that suit from going forward, but if they did not, it could be unfair to
a defendant to subject it to substantial litigation in that state based on such a
thin reed. The same might be true if, for some reason, the addition of
multistate class members did seriously complicate a lawsuit in a way that
made it much more burdensome to defend but also did not thwart class
certification.
It may be difficult to foresee exactly what kinds of suits would result in
such scenarios, but that is basically the point of the exception—that there
may be a variety of unforeseen circumstances in which litigation would result
in unfairness even if it meets the normal standards for jurisdiction.215 And it
214. See, e.g., Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 279 (4th Cir.
2009) (“The third prong—that the exercise of personal jurisdiction be constitutionally
reasonable—permits a court to consider additional factors to ensure the appropriateness of the
forum once it has determined that a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of doing business there.”); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir.
1999) (referring to this third prong as an “overall reasonableness” test); Terracom v. Valley
Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
215. One particular set of issues specific to class actions that courts may wish to consider
under the “overall reasonableness” test is how cohesive the class is. In Judge Wood’s 1987
discussion of the relationship between personal jurisdiction and representative litigation, she
argued that whether a class representative’s claims alone can permit a court to have jurisdiction
over a defendant for an entire class depends on how cohesive the class is. See Wood, supra
note 31, at 601–05. Judge Wood’s model does not map easily onto the categories within Rule
23, see id. at 602, but the common (b)(3) small-value damages class generally falls within her
account of the “purely representational” class in which jurisdiction is permissible, id. at 616.
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would be a mistake to declare multistate class litigation categorically unfair
from the personal jurisdiction perspective simply because of these potential
outlier scenarios. The “overall reasonableness” part of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry can be taken as an acknowledgment that bright-line rules
will inevitably miss certain concerns, and an indication that the current
structure of the doctrine deals with this problem by having more permissive
rules combined with a veto option provided to courts when those rules fail to
catch particularly problematic instances.
The third prong of the
specific-jurisdiction test thus supports the conclusion that it is unnecessary
to rule multistate class actions out entirely based on the possibility that in rare
circumstances one may emerge that seems abusive.
4. Traditional Notions of Fairness
Finally, when considering whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant with respect to the claims of out-of-state absent class
members, we should be mindful of the fact that suits like the model class
have been proceeding for decades. Because of the previously broad
understandings of general jurisdiction, defendants in these class actions
would not have been able to successfully assert a personal jurisdiction
defense. As a result, multistate class actions have proceeded regularly for
nearly half a century against companies in states where they are not
headquartered and do not have their principal place of business.216
The changed scope of general jurisdiction means that, as a legal matter,
these cases must now proceed within the confines of specific jurisdiction.
But the historical fact that companies have been subject for decades to
multistate and nationwide suits outside their states of headquarter and
incorporation should be relevant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry. That is
because the underlying personal jurisdiction inquiry is grounded in

This conclusion is bolstered by Judge Wood’s recent invocation of the representative nature
of class actions to justify personal jurisdiction in the post-BMS case Mussat v. IQVIA, 953
F.3d 441, 445–48 (7th Cir. 2020). In the years since Judge Wood’s 1987 article, class
certification standards have tightened significantly, and it is unclear whether there are many
class actions that would now be certified under Rule 23 that would not be sufficiently cohesive
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Judge Wood’s reasoning. See, e.g., Robert
G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 677–704 (2014)
(describing the tightening of class certification standards as motivated in part by a desire to
limit classes to cohesive groups). But for the kind of class that might fit such a bill—for
instance, a class with a small number of individuals with large individual claims, where there
are many potential individual defenses that a defendant could raise despite the predominance
of common questions—the “overall reasonableness” element of the personal jurisdiction
inquiry could be used to hold that, all things considered, it would be unreasonable to extend
jurisdiction over the defendant to the claims of unnamed class members solely on the basis of
representation.
216. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Bradt &
Rave, supra note 13, at 1284 (“Likely because they were operating under the more expansive
understanding of general jurisdiction before Goodyear, no one involved seemed to question
the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant [in Shutts].”); Wood, supra note 31, at 613–15
(describing how general jurisdiction was available in Shutts).
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adherence to traditional notions of fairness,217 and particularly in the desire
not to subject defendants to jurisdiction that they could not reasonably
foresee.218 Most companies have likely had to anticipate and address these
lawsuits for the entire time that they have been in existence—the modern
class action rule was adopted in 1966, and Shutts was handed down in 1985,
while companies in the S&P 500 are, on average, only twenty years old.219
For any defendant whose goods and services cross state boundaries,
multistate and nationwide class actions outside of their home state have been
a reality that should reasonably have been baked into their business
expectations for decades.
On the other side of the scale, the benefits to plaintiffs, states, and the
multistate judicial system as a whole have not changed.220 Restricting
jurisdiction in these cases where the facts on the ground are no different now
than in the last half-century would thus amount to a jurisdictional windfall
for defendants, giving them increased protections—and making it harder for
plaintiffs to bring cases—when the distribution of benefits and burdens
remains the same.
B. Federalism
In addition to considering the burden on the defendant, personal
jurisdiction doctrine has another foundational concern: the limits of state
power in a federal system of coequal sovereigns.221 Although this concern
is abstract, it can also be weighty in the eyes of the law—enough so that the
“interstate federalism” concern “may be decisive,” depriving a court of
personal jurisdiction even if there is “minimal or no inconvenience” to the
defendant, the forum state has a strong interest in the case, and the forum
state is the most convenient location.222
It is this horizontal federalism concern that provides the strongest
grounding for the state-border argument after the Supreme Court’s decision
in BMS. As just discussed, the argument about the burdens of litigation is
not particularly strong—the defendant is already in the forum defending
against identical or nearly identical claims to the claims at issue, and
increased potential liability is not relevant to the inquiry. The only thing
distinguishing the absent class members’ claims at issue in the model class
217. See, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 621–22 (1990) (Scalia, J.); id. at 629
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “history is an important factor in establishing whether a
jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements”).
218. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
219. MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, DAN CALLAHAN & DARIUS MAJD, CREDIT SUISSE,
CORPORATE LONGEVITY: INDEX TURNOVER AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 1 (2017),
https://research-doc.creditsuisse.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&sourceid=csplusresearchcp&document
_id=1070991801&serialid=0xhJ7ymG%2BLuZxZzmUHitAOqfIGpMxjfNOq%2FHpp%2F
K2LU%3D&cspId=null [https://perma.cc/P9DN-HP8Z].
220. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
221. Id.
222. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294).
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is that they may be unconnected with the forum state. If that distinction can
be “decisive,” then it may provide a basis for cleaving the out-of-state class
members’ claims from the in-state class members’ claims.
But in addition to showing concern for the proper limitation of state power
in a federated system, personal jurisdiction doctrine also is attentive to the
benefits that may flow to “the interstate judicial system” by allocating
jurisdiction efficiently.223 And the various benefits that have historically
justified class actions—in particular, the efficiency of resolving similar cases
in one fell swoop and the resolution of claims that might not otherwise be
brought—accrue to both the forum state and non-forum states. Additionally,
states share an interest in deterring unlawful conduct—and nationwide class
actions may be the most effective deterrent for a defendant’s nationwide
conduct.224
The section proceeds by identifying the main federalism concern raised by
the model class—that declining to apply the minimum contacts test to absent
class members’ claims will allow some states to overreach and resolve claims
that other states have more of an interest in. It then discusses factors that
mitigate that concern and also notes that similar concerns have been
outweighed by considerations of judicial efficiency in the context of
nonmutual issue preclusion. The section then argues that the state-border
argument itself has downsides from the perspective of horizontal federalism
and that allowing the model class to proceed would have significant upsides
from that perspective as well. The section concludes that, on balance,
considerations of horizontal federalism weigh in favor of exercising
jurisdiction.
1. The Horizontal Federalism Concern Raised by the Model Class
Personal jurisdiction’s concerns for horizontal federalism go back to
Pennoyer v. Neff,225 which emphasized that the equal dignity of the states
implies limitations on the territorial reach of their power.226 Because each
state, as a sovereign, has the power to try cases in its own courts, there are
implied limits on the ability of states to exercise authority over cases that
more appropriately “belong” to another state.227 This, in turn, gives rise to
the horizontal federalism concern underlying the state-border argument: if
absent class members’ claims are not required to satisfy the minimum
contacts test, the argument posits, it will be possible for the forum state to

223. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
224. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 782
(2016) (noting that Rule 23 allows for liability that “mirrors the scope of [a defendant’s]
misconduct”); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006) (arguing
that class actions’ deterrent power is the primary source of their social value).
225. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
226. Id. at 722.
227. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
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exercise power over a claim that has no connection to its territory and that
more rightfully should be adjudicated by another state.228
But in the particular context of multistate class actions, this horizontal
federalism concern should be discounted for several reasons. First, as Shutts
established, the Due Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution limit the ability of states to apply their own laws to claims
that have more of a connection to other states.229 In the multistate class
action context, this restriction protects non-forum-states’ interests in having
their own law apply to events that they have an interest in and which are only
loosely or minimally connected to the forum state.230 Shutts itself illustrates
how this protection can work in practice: these constitutional choice-of-law
principles prevented Kansas from applying its law across the board to claims
arising from events in Oklahoma and Texas.231 In the decades since Shutts,
courts have employed its choice-of-law holding to guard against state-law
overreach when plaintiffs have sought multistate and nationwide class
certification.232
This choice-of-law protection, admittedly, does not entirely remove the
federalism concern. After all, the Supreme Court tends to give forum states
a relatively wide berth for their choice-of-law determinations,233 and the
forum state will still generally be applying its own procedural rules—
including its rules governing class actions in the first place—to the claims of
out-of-state absent class members. But states’ choice-of-law rules still
generally focus on the locus of the events giving rise to the claim, resulting
in class actions that attend to the laws of different states.234 And, as a
practical matter, the CAFA means that most substantial class actions brought
in states will be removed to federal courts, which have a standardized set of
228. See, e.g., Capozzi, supra note 14, at 279–80.
229. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–21 (1985).
230. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:46 (18th ed. 2021).
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Corder v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F.R.D. 205, 208–09 (W.D. Ky. 2011)
(holding that Shutts prohibited application of one state’s laws to all claims in a multistate
class); Cullen v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 3:09-0180, 2010 WL 11579748, at *3–6 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 26, 2010) (same); D.R. Ward Constr. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 2:05-cv-4157,
2006 WL 8441573, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006) (same); Montgomery v. New Piper
Aircraft, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 221, 229 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (same). The principles discussed in Shutts
also sometimes operate in tandem with state choice-of-law rules to prevent state overreach by
defeating class certification to begin with, for instance where the necessary application of
multiple states’ laws means that a class action grows too complex to merit certification. See
1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 230, § 5:46 (“In accordance with Shutts, in a
proposed nationwide or multi-state class action, proper application of the forum state’s
choice-of-law rules usually results in the application of numerous states’ laws to the proposed
class, and ‘variations in state law may swamp any common issues and defeat predominance.’”
(quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996))).
233. Andrew D. Bradt, Atlantic Marine and Choice-of-Law Federalism, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
617, 623 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s “lenient approach to constitutional
supervision of states’ choice-of-law rules”).
234. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. L. INST. 1971);
see also Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An
End and A Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1900–04.
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procedural rules.235 This mitigates horizontal federalism concerns by
creating a similar across-the-board process for much class litigation: federal
law provides the rules of procedure, with state law providing the substantive
standards in diversity cases—often with an examination and application of
the varying laws of the different states in which class members reside, and
always within the bounds of the Constitution’s choice-of-law protections.236
Second, the horizontal federalism concerns of the state-border argument
should be discounted at least somewhat because of the significant likelihood
that if the state-border argument were adopted, a number of claims might
simply never be brought to begin with. Class actions are expensive to bring,
and lawyers will often be willing to bring them only if there is a mass of class
members large enough to generate a sizeable damages award (or
settlement).237 While some larger states like California, Texas, or New York
may be able to generate intrastate classes of a large enough size with some
regularity, many other states—Vermont, Idaho, Wyoming, Kansas, etc.—
may lack a sufficient population base to justify class actions for a wide
variety of small-value claims.
As a result, the interests these states have in the adjudication of this class
of claims is largely hypothetical. The states themselves will be unlikely to
ever get a chance to adjudicate them. When it comes to assessing
individuals’ due process rights, courts take into account the fact that the value
of their claims may be next to nothing absent the class device.238 The

235. Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1282 (“[S]ince CAFA, most multistate class actions
of any consequence have already wound up in federal courts . . . .”).
236. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–23 (1985). The fact that most
significant class actions end up in federal court also points to another mechanism by which
multistate and nationwide class actions could proceed despite BMS. Although the Supreme
Court has not conclusively weighed in, the best understanding of personal jurisdiction doctrine
in federal courts is that it is governed by the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the relevant minimum contacts analysis is with respect to the nation as
a whole. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66
UCLA L. REV. 654, 714 n.290 (2019). Aside from lawsuits in which Congress has provided
for nationwide service of process, federal courts are usually limited by the personal
jurisdiction constraints of the states in which they sit via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). But because that constraint is not constitutional, if Rule 4 were
amended, it would be possible for federal courts to hear multistate or nationwide class actions
based on a defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole, regardless of how absent
class members are treated for purposes of constitutional due process. This, in turn, would
likely allow for federal courts in most cases involving conduct that occurred in the United
States to hear the claims of all absent class members within the United States as a whole. For
an argument that Rule 4 should be amended to uncouple personal jurisdiction in federal courts
from the territorial boundaries of the states in which they sit, see A. Benjamin Spencer,
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 325 (2010).
237. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV.
1855, 1916–17 (2015) (noting that “[a]ggregate litigation is not cheap: Plaintiffs’ lawyers
spend significant resources cultivating both generic and plaintiff-specific assets” and also that
“without a class, some people would never sue” (citing Joe Nocera, Forget Fair; It’s Litigation
as Usual, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/business/
17nocera.html [https://perma.cc/W7U8-YU3D])).
238. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809 (noting that “[c]lass actions . . . may permit the
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually” and describing
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horizontal federalism inquiry should similarly acknowledge that states’
interests in adjudicating their citizens’ claims may be highly attenuated in a
world where adopting the state-border argument makes it unlikely that some
of those claims will be heard at all in the state to which they have the greatest
connection.239
Next, the example of issue preclusion suggests that it is not particularly
far-fetched to assess the tradeoff between horizontal federalism and the
efficient allocation of judicial resources in a way that favors efficiency. The
horizontal federalism concern raised by the state-border argument parallels
the concerns that exist in the context of issue preclusion, where the law
allows one state’s courts to influence or even resolve the claims of
unconnected individuals outside the state’s borders. Where one court has
jurisdiction over a defendant and decides an issue against that defendant, that
determination binds that defendant in subsequent litigation even in other
jurisdictions.
The fact that issue preclusion can be used offensively and nonmutually
means that it can operate in a way that is quite similar to a court resolving
absent class members’ claims that are unconnected to the forum state. Take,
for instance, a large corporate defendant facing a claim that it negligently
designed a product that it sold throughout the country. A court in State A
may issue a ruling against the defendant on the question of negligent design
based on a sale that took place in State A to a resident of State A. Then, if a
resident of State B sues the defendant in State B under a comparable law,
issue preclusion will usually resolve the case, binding the defendant to the
same outcome.240 As a result, State A is able to bind the defendant to a
particular resolution of the claims of individuals in other states who have no
connection to State A.
There are, of course, meaningful differences between issue preclusion and
class actions. First, issue preclusion requires the plaintiffs in other states to
take a variety of affirmative steps—most basically, filing a suit and invoking
issue preclusion. One could argue, therefore, that issue preclusion treats
would-be class action members differently, requiring significantly more
affirmative buy-in than the opt-out measures required by Shutts for (b)(3)
class actions. Second, issue preclusion operates by the law of the forum
state—for instance, the courts of State B in the example in the previous
paragraph are bound only because the law of State B has adopted the doctrine

how in that case “most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action
were not available”).
239. Although some of these claims could be resolved—consistent with the state-border
argument—by a multistate class action brought under general jurisdiction in a defendant’s
home state, that does not significantly change the calculus from the perspective of the states
that would not be the forum state in either event. If Vermont has an interest in adjudicating
the claims of its residents, that interest is the same regardless of whether the claim ends up
being adjudicated in California under a theory of specific jurisdiction or in Delaware under a
theory of general jurisdiction.
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
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of issue preclusion, not because State A’s courts have forced anything on
State B.
But while these distinctions are meaningful, they are discounted by
personal jurisdiction doctrine’s emphasis on the burden on the defendant—
even when examining horizontal federalism concerns.241 From the
defendant’s perspective, nonmutual issue preclusion has similar effects to
multistate class actions in a world where the state-border argument is
rejected. Both procedural devices permit a single state court to bind the
defendant to the same outcome with respect to the claims of individuals in
the state and outside the state, regardless of whether those individuals outside
the state have a connection to the forum. And the resource efficiency
considerations that justify issue preclusion certainly weigh even more
heavily in favor of class adjudication for claims that are so similar that a class
action is permissible.242
Issue preclusion thus suggests that the kind of horizontal federalism
concerns invoked by the state-border argument may yield when there are
strong enough advantages to the interstate judicial system to justify the
ability of one state’s courts to resolve issues in a way that has preclusive
effects in other states. The following section describes the advantages that
class actions like the model class have from the perspective of horizontal
federalism, and concludes by arguing that, on net, considerations of
horizontal federalism weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction in the model
class.
2. The Horizontal Federalism Benefits of Exercising Jurisdiction
Allowing multistate class actions to be brought as they have been for the
last several decades—without requiring the absent class members’ claims to
satisfy the minimum contacts test—has a variety of benefits from the
perspective of horizontal federalism.
a. Avoiding Inconsistent Outcomes
First, these multistate and nationwide class actions avoid the increased
possibility of conflicting judicial outcomes that could result if the
state-border argument were adopted. If functionally identical claims could
not be litigated together in a single class action, the risk of inconsistent
outcomes in different courts would increase. The desire to avoid inconsistent
outcomes is well established, underwriting a wide variety of procedural
rules—ranging from foundational rules such as res judicata243 and the joinder

241. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
242. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1979) (citing
Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971)) (discussing
the resource-allocation benefits of issue preclusion).
243. Kevin M. Clermont, Limiting the Last-in-Time Rule for Judgments, 36 REV. LITIG. 1,
2 (2017) (“One of the obvious purposes of our res judicata law is to minimize the possibility
of inconsistent judgments.”).
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of necessary parties244 to more specific doctrines such as the
prior-pending-action doctrine245 or the exhaustion of state remedies in habeas
corpus actions.246 And, of course, promoting “uniformity of decision” is one
of the goals underlying Rule 23 and the creation of the modern class action
itself.247
This concern is particularly strong when it comes to class actions brought
under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). So far, these kinds of suits—the “mandatory”
class actions—have largely escaped discussion in the case law and literature
dealing with the state-border argument, which have generally exhibited what
Professor Maureen Carroll has described more broadly as the “myopic”
tendency to focus on class actions arising under Rule 23(b)(3).248 But these
other types of class actions pose a particular problem here because they are
premised around factual scenarios that have a strong need for a unitary
solution.249 As discussed above, class actions arose historically from
disputes where a fair and effective resolution depended on a single
disposition—such as disputes where there are many claims to money from a
common fund.250 In these disputes, allowing one set of plaintiffs to recover
first may diminish the availability of relief for other, identically situated
plaintiffs. Similarly, in other cases plaintiffs may seek logically indivisible
relief, such as the restructuring of a board or program, where a defendant is
physically unable to provide partial relief or give relief only to some

244. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER & LUMEN N.
MULLIGAN, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY r. 19 (2021)
(noting that courts examine whether a party will be subject to inconsistent obligations when
determining whether the party is required to be joined under Rule 19).
245. See, e.g., 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1360 (3d ed. 2021) (noting that the desire to avoid conflicting opinions leads
courts to dismiss identical actions where earlier actions have already been filed); Quality One
Wireless, LLC v. Goldie Grp., LLC, 37 F. Supp. 3d 536, 540–43 (D. Mass. 2014) (discussing
the prior-pending-action doctrine).
246. See, e.g., McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156–57 (2019) (noting that the
malicious prosecution tort’s favorable-termination requirement and the state-exhaustion
requirement of federal habeas law are both designed to promote consistency); see also Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976) (noting a rule
requiring courts to yield jurisdiction to avoid inconsistent dispositions of property in
litigation).
247. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
248. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843 (2016) (describing how
(b)(3) class actions often get more attention than the mandatory classes, even though the latter
are still frequently used).
249. See, e.g., id. at 852–60.
250. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text; see also Miller & Crump, supra note
104, at 38–57 (discussing mandatory class actions and their jurisdictional implications).
Professors Miller and Crump propose a four-factor test regarding the permissibility of
jurisdiction in multistate mandatory class actions, taking into account efficiency and equity
concerns, as well as federalism concerns. Id. While they propose an analysis that would occur
during the determination of whether class certification is appropriate, it is possible to envision
a similar kind of determination as part of the “overall reasonableness” analysis as to whether
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is appropriate. See supra notes 214–15 and
accompanying text.
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claimants and not to others.251 The desire to avoid inconsistent judgments in
such cases is baked into the text of Rule 23 itself.252
The conduct that gives rise to mandatory class actions may not be cleanly
apportioned along state borders, and the nature of indivisible relief could give
rise to serious problems if class actions were to become divided by state lines.
Mandatory classes arise in a wide range of contexts—from reimbursements
by insurance organizations to corporate dividend payments to the merging of
sports leagues.253 The conduct at issue in these circumstances can easily
cross state lines. Consider, for instance, litigation arising from the question
whether an insurer’s policy covers consequential damages resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic. It may be clear that, if the policy does cover such
damages, the insurer’s fund is inadequate to satisfy all the claims that would
be made on it and the claimants satisfy the requirements for a “common fund”
class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). If numerous intrastate class
actions are brought, different rulings may result as to both whether the policy
should be read to cover the damages and as to how the fund should pay out.
The result would be to seriously undermine the desire, affirmed in cases such
as Ibs, to have similarly situated parties treated the same even if they reside
in a different state.254
From the perspective of horizontal federalism, it is not an adequate answer
to point out that multistate or nationwide class actions could still be brought
in a defendant’s home state.255 It may be the case that a nationwide class
action brought in a defendant’s home state could cleanly resolve a (b)(1) or
(b)(2) class action even if the state-border argument were adopted. But that
would cure the potential problem of fragmented judicial opinions only if such
a case were brought before other, intrastate class actions that threatened
inconsistent judgments arose.256 In a world where BMS were applied to
251. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 248, at 852–61 (providing examples); see also Maureen
Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59, 76–87 (2019)
(discussing different contexts in which indivisible relief may be important in class actions
brought under Rule 23(b)(2) in particular).
252. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) (providing grounds for class certification where
“inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class” or where “adjudications with respect to individual class
members . . . would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests”).
253. See, e.g., Miller & Crump, supra note 104, at 40–41 & nn.279–85 (providing examples
of cases).
254. See Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, at 670–71 (1915) (“The [f]und was
single, but having been made up of contributions from thousands of members their interest
was common. It would have been destructive of their mutual rights in the plan of [m]utual
[i]nsurance to use the [m]ortuary [f]und in one way for claims of members residing in one
[s]tate and to use it in another way as to claims of members residing in a different [s]tate.”).
255. See, e.g., Ichel, supra note 26, at 45–46 (arguing that “if plaintiffs [sic] class counsel
are mindful in their forum selection process, the issue of non-resident absent class members
should not present significant jurisdictional issues” because, in part, of the availability of
general jurisdiction in a defendant’s home state(s)).
256. In certain circumstances, it might also be possible for a class action proceeding in
federal court to secure an injunction against pending state court proceedings, so long as the
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absent class members’ claims, states would still have an interest in
adjudicating intrastate class actions based on theories of specific jurisdiction.
And states acting on that interest would create serious horizontal federalism
concerns, both because of the risk of inconsistent judgments and the
possibility that people with identical claims will be treated differently based
solely on their state of residence.257
b. The Efficient Resolution of Mass Disputes
As discussed in Part II, the efficient resolution of numerous claims has
undergirded the use of group representative litigation for centuries. These
efficiencies are just as present when class members come from multiple
jurisdictions. In an integrated national market such as the United States,
individuals throughout the country may sign on to the same contracts with a
national bank; they may buy the same products from the same manufacturer
at different branches of the same retailer; they may be employed by the same
employer; they may be targeted by the same debt collector. Economies of
scale allow these companies to grow and develop into national and
international markets. Those same economies of scale, which may depend
on standardized forms, marketing materials, employment practices, and so
on, will often mean that a company’s violation of the law occurs in a
standardized way as well—such as when a negligently manufactured product
is distributed nationwide or when a standard contract contains terms that
violate common legal protections. As a result, legal disputes will often
involve individuals scattered across the country who have essentially
identical claims against a common actor.
It is far more efficient to allow all those who share a claim against a
defendant to resolve those claims together, compared to an alternative of
Balkanizing lawsuits along state lines. Class suits have high fixed costs but
lower variable costs, for both courts and litigants—once lawyers are hired,
arguments are made, evidence is gathered, and so on, the cost of resolving an
additional class member’s claims is small.258 In contrast, the costs of setting
up another case would be significant, potentially requiring the hiring of new
counsel barred in the relevant jurisdiction, new rounds of motion practice,
and so on.
For purposes of horizontal federalism, it is significant to note that the
greater efficiency of multistate class actions accrues to the benefit of both the
forum state and non-forum states. The forum state benefits from multistate
provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act are satisfied. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
257. Individuals in different states could be treated differently, even absent inconsistent
judgments, because some states may simply have no intrastate class actions at all, leaving
citizens in those states who do not bring their own suits with a different outcome than absent
class members in states where there was an action.
258. Admittedly, the marginal cost of adding an additional class member goes up when
adding that member means addressing the laws of a different state, adding a distinct subclass,
or so on. But even that cost is amortized over all of the additional members of that state or
subclass.
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class actions because it is able to leverage the size of a multistate class to
incentivize the vindication of its own residents’ legal rights. Non-forum
states, meanwhile, benefit from the efficient resolution of their own
residents’ claims (as compared to the costs of state-by-state litigation). This
shared efficiency interest—“the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”—has long been part
of personal jurisdiction doctrine’s attention to horizontal federalism.259
c. Avoiding Unresolved Claims
As mentioned above, adopting the state-border argument increases the risk
that some claims that would otherwise be adjudicated as part of a nationwide
class action will not be resolved at all. Many states, particularly smaller ones,
may not have enough affected residents in a given dispute to make an
intrastate class action economically feasible.260 In such a scenario, residents
of those states have only two hopes: (1) that their state will become the forum
state in a multistate class action, enabling them to benefit from the economies
of scale generated by including more class members; or (2) that another state
will hear a class action in which they are included in the class definition.
If the state-border argument is adopted, small states will be unable to be
the forum state for a nationwide class action themselves unless they are the
defendant’s place of incorporation or headquarters; and they likewise will be
unable to benefit from multistate class actions in other states unless a class
action is brought in a state where the defendant is subject to general
jurisdiction. To the extent that general jurisdiction suits filed in a defendant’s
home state do not make up for 100 percent of the multistate suits that would
have been filed elsewhere, then, there will be claims that go unresolved
because of the adoption of the state-border argument.
d. Decreasing Opportunities for Collusive Settlements
As Professors Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave have pointed out,
there are potentially concerning dynamics that arise in an interstate system
from the fact that problems of personal jurisdiction can be waived by a
defendant’s consent.261 In particular, defendants can engage in a “reverse
auction,” in which the defendant consents to nationwide jurisdiction in
whatever jurisdiction is most favorable to the defendant.262
259. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citing
Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978)).
260. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1454–55 (“Bristol-Myers did not consider the
possibility that aggregation beyond the claims of in-state plaintiffs might be necessary to make
the claims of in-state plaintiffs economically viable.”). The two possibilities outlined in this
paragraph, along with the discussion in this section generally, assume that the defendant will
not consent to multistate jurisdiction. The potential for a defendant to consent to jurisdiction
in any particular state raises its own problems, discussed below. See infra notes 261–65 and
accompanying text.
261. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 13.
262. Id. at 1289.
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As Professors Bradt and Rave note, the adoption of the state-border
argument would result in an asymmetry between plaintiffs’ and defendants’
forum-shopping abilities.263 Plaintiffs seeking to certify a nationwide class
would generally only be able to certify a class on the defendant’s “home
turf,” the state where it is incorporated or headquartered (and therefore may
have more political influence).264 But defendants can consent to jurisdiction
anywhere they want to. This creates an opportunity for collusion:
sophisticated plaintiffs’ lawyers in one forum can offer a class-wide
settlement that is relatively more beneficial for the defendant and class
counsel than it is for the absent class members. And the defendant, seeing a
better deal than it is likely to receive elsewhere, can decline to assert a
personal jurisdiction defense in that particular case, resulting in the
settlement of a nationwide class in that forum on terms more favorable to the
defendant.265
e. Improving Deterrence
Each of the preceding three problems—inefficient resolution of claims,
claims going unheard, and collusive settlements—are issues in their own
right. But they also combine to form aspects of a more general problem from
the perspective of horizontal federalism, which is the problem of inadequate
deterrence. In addition to the goals of efficiently resolving disputes and
providing an effective forum, class actions further the foundational law
enforcement goal of deterrence.266 Investigating and policing infractions is
often costly and difficult. Particularly in states where not enough individuals
are harmed to justify an intrastate class action, there may not be enough harm
within the state to justify the expenditure of scarce public resources on law
enforcement. The availability of multistate class actions in particular thus
helps bolster states’ abilities to enforce their own laws against interstate and
national actors whose violations may be too diffuse to be the focus of
attention in many (or perhaps any) states.
The adoption of the state-boundary argument is therefore likely to
undermine the deterrent effect served by multistate class actions. That
deterrent effect is largely premised on the ability of class actions to force
defendants to internalize the costs of their actions.267 By decreasing the
efficient resolution of claims, causing some claims to be left on the table, and
incentivizing defendant-favoring settlements, the adoption of the
263. Id. at 1290.
264. In a limited subset of cases, it may also be possible to certify a class based on a theory
of specific jurisdiction in a state where the defendant is not at home but has engaged in a
nationwide course of conduct, such as a state where the defendant manufactured a product that
it subsequently shipped across the country.
265. Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1290–91.
266. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? (Vanderbilt
Univ. L. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 17-40, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3020282 [https://perma.cc/9W6E-5XY2].
267. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 224, at 105 (arguing that the “normative
polestar” of deterrence is whether a defendant “internalize[s] the social costs of its actions”).
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state-boundary argument would decrease the costs faced by defendants as a
consequence of multistate class litigation. That conclusion should be
unsurprising; the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions, and BMS in
particular, are generally regarded as defendant-friendly, and the decreased
costs defendants would face as a result of expanding their logic to class
actions is relatively straightforward. But, importantly, those decreased costs
are relevant to the horizontal federalism concerns of personal jurisdiction,
which looks to the interests states have in the effective enforcement of their
laws.268
Considerations of horizontal federalism thus, on balance, weigh in favor
of exercising jurisdiction in the model class. The concerns regarding the
inappropriate exercise of state power are mitigated by constitutional limits
on the application of state substantive law, as well as Congress’s ability
(which it has exercised via CAFA) to make the majority of class actions
removable to federal court, where state procedural rules do not apply.269 And
multistate class actions carry a significant number of benefits from the
perspective of horizontal federalism—they militate against inconsistent
outcomes, facilitate the adjudication of claims that otherwise would go
unheard, provide a more efficient resolution of mass claims, lessen the
problem of collusive settlements posed by the extension of BMS, and help to
deter unlawful conduct. These benefits all sound in the register of horizontal
federalism, addressing concerns that the Supreme Court has long held should
be considered when evaluating whether jurisdiction is appropriate.270
Respect for horizontal federalism thus cuts against adopting the state-border
argument, not in favor of it.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court does not require lower courts to apply the minimum contacts test to
the claims of absent class members, and it should not be expanded to create
such a requirement. The history of class actions and their precursors
demonstrate that representative litigation is often afforded a wide swath of
procedural exceptions, and excepting the claims of absent class members
from the normal minimum contacts requirement is well within the kinds of
exceptions that have traditionally been carved out. Allowing multistate and
nationwide class actions to proceed with specific jurisdiction based only on
the named representative’s claims, meanwhile, does not pose a significant
problem from the perspective of constitutional due process. The state-border
argument should therefore be rejected, and courts should continue allowing
such multistate and nationwide class actions to proceed as they have for
decades.

268. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citing
Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978)).
269. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
270. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.

